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Abstract. As organisations expand and interconnect, authorisation in-
frastructures become increasingly difficult to manage. Several solutions
have been proposed, including self-adaptive authorisation, where the ac-
cess control policies are dynamically adapted at run-time to respond to
misuse and malicious behaviour. The ultimate goal of self-adaptive au-
thorisation is to reduce human intervention, make authorisation infras-
tructures more responsive to malicious behaviour, and manage access
control in a more cost effective way. In this paper, we scope and define
the emerging area of self-adaptive authorisation by describing some of
its developments, trends and challenges. For that, we start by identifying
key concepts related to access control and authorisation infrastructures,
and provide a brief introduction to self-adaptive software systems, which
provides the foundation for investigating how self-adaptation can enable
the enforcement of authorisation policies. The outcome of this study is
the identification of several technical challenges related to self-adaptive
authorisation, which are classified according to the different stages of a
feedback control loop.
1 Introduction
A critical concern for organisations surrounds the assurances of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of their computer based resources. To provide such
assurances, organisations utilise access control to protect against unauthorised
access. Regardless of adopting a fine grained approach to access control, abuse
of access is still possible. Any form of access, no matter how restrictive, presents
the risk of attacks due to uncertainty in user behaviour. To accommodate for
this risk, organisations employ a range of methods [42] to monitor and audit
access within their systems and resources.
Traditionally, human administrators are relied upon to actively identify and
drive changes in access control in response to detected abuse, natural organi-
sational change, or identified errors in the criteria for access. It is challenging
for human administrators to maintain a true awareness of the configuration of
access, particularly within a run-time environment. With no complete view of
access, obtaining assurances [30] against changes made to mitigate the abuse of
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access is limited. This potentially enables erroneous changes that cause a greater
impact to the organisation over identified abuse. In addition, and as evident in
case studies of historic insider attacks [16], the use of human administrators
alone is inefficient in mitigating abuse in a timely manner. Improving on access
control methodologies is one solution, yet such approaches [10,33,41,57] are un-
able to actively mitigate abuse, since they are constrained to a static definition
of the criteria for access control at run-time.
Implementations of authorisation infrastructures [19] must be capable in han-
dling the dynamic aspect of risk at run-time, driven by the uncertainty in user
behaviour. It is therefore necessary for such systems to actively observe how
access rights are being used, in order to infer whether the current criteria and
assignment of access are enabling a user to conduct malicious activity. A promis-
ing solution for the provision of dynamic support to authorisation infrastructures
is the incorporation of self-adaptation.
Self-adaptive systems are systems that are able to modify their behaviour
and/or structure in response changes that occur to the system itself, its environ-
ment, or even its goals [22]. Applying self-adaptive techniques to authorisation
infrastructures enables the infrastructure to observe, reason, and act on its own
configuration of access control. Through the use of a feedback loop [15], it is pos-
sible to employ a clear separation of concerns between the decision for access,
and decision for a management change, therefore reducing the complexity in the
criteria for access that dynamic access control approaches introduce.
The main contribution of this paper is identification of several technical chal-
lenges associated with the self-adaptation of authorisation infrastructures. The
relevance of the identified challenges is discussed in the context of insider threat
examples related to a Customer Energy Management System (EMS) case study.
Another contribution is related to how the self-adaptation of authorisation in-
frastructures should be structured in order to handle parametric adaptations,
i.e., the specification of access rights of subjects to resources, and structural
adaptations, i.e., the enforcement of those specifications by controlling the sub-
ject’s access to a resource.
The rest of paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the concepts
and terminology related to access control and authorisation infrastructures, and
provides a brief introduction to self-adaptive software systems. In Section 3, we
introduce a simple case study, based on NIST Smart Grid specification, that will
be used as a basis for introducing self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures. We
review the related work on dynamic access control in context of self-protection
in Section 4. In Section 5, we map our perception of self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructures into the modelling dimensions for self-adaptive software systems.
Section 6 identifies, in terms of the key stages of a feedback control loop, like the
MAPE-K loop, some challenges associated with the engineering self-adaptive au-
thorisation infrastructures. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and indicates
directions for future work.
2 Background
The focus of this paper is the application of self-adaptation in the management
of privileges and the rendering of access control decisions, in order to reduce
the need for human intervention, whilst reducing cost, and enabling systems
to robustly adapt when responding to change. As such, the following section
discusses some background topics, including, prominent access control models,
authorisation infrastructures as a means to implement access control, static and
dynamic access control, self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures that are ca-
pable of adapting themselves at run-time, and finally, insider threats that we
employ as a motivation for managing access control.
2.1 Access Control Models
In the literature, the terms authorisation and access control are sometimes used
interchangeably. In this paper, we define them as follows.
Definition 1 (Authorisation). Authorisation refers to the specification of
whether a subject has access to a resource.
Definition 2 (Access control). Access control refers to the enforcement of
authorisation by controlling (i.e., granting or denying) subject’s access to a re-
source.
The goal of access control is to prevent unauthorised access to protected
resources. A resource could be anything from a software system (e.g., web ap-
plication and database) to an electronic device (e.g., electronic door lock and
mobile phone). Through the specification of authorisation, captured in terms
of policies, an organisation garners a certain level of protection from unwanted
access.
Authorisation embodies two concepts: identities and permissions. An identity
is a digital representation of a subject (a user), where a subject could be a human
being, a system, or even a process [10]. An identity contains information about
the subject, particularly relevant for authentication [58], where a subject must
identify themselves, for example, entering in a username and password, or use
of biometrics [61]. Most importantly, an identity contains a set of the subject’s
access rights (also referred to as privileges [20]). Access rights, as the name
suggests, represent a subject’s right of access to a resource, used in accordance
to a set of permissions. Once a subject obtains the required access right(s) to a
resource, the subject is said to be authorised.
Access control models classify and define how permissions are expressed, who
can define permissions, and what an access right looks like [53]. For example,
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [37] enables subjects with a set of security
attributes to access resources in conformance to centrally specified permissions
(i.e., defined by security administrators). In contrast, Discretionary Access Con-
trol (DAC) [37] enables subjects in a similar sense to MAC to access resources,
however, permissions can be specified by the subjects themselves in relation to
the resources that they own. Another access control model is the Bell-LaPadula
Model (BLP) [9] where permissions are based on labelled classifications, such as,
Top Secret or Public, and a subject’s level of security clearance.
Arguably, the most adopted access control model in industry is the Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) model [50], where recently 50% of the 150 com-
panies surveyed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
had adopted RBAC by 2010 [54]. RBAC introduced the notion of roles, whereby
a role is assigned a set of permissions that enable access to a resource. Finally,
the Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model [77] presents a more generic
view of the RBAC model, where instead of roles, attributes (a type - value tuple)
are used in order to collate and assign permissions.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC). The Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) model is the culmination of work by Ferraiolo et al. [26] and Sandhu
et al. [64] that led to the NIST RBAC standard [50]. The RBAC standard is
defined by three layers, each layer extending the layer prior with additional fea-
tures. These layers are referred to as Core, Hierarchical, and Constrained.
RBAC Core defines the fundamental elements that must exist within an
implementation of RBAC model, namely: subjects (identities), roles, resources,
actions, permissions, and sessions. Subjects are assigned a set of roles, where a
role defines a function within an organisation (e.g., operations manager). Roles
are assigned permissions, where each permission details the ability for a sub-
ject to execute an action (e.g., print) on a resource (e.g., printer). A subject’s
session captures a set of roles that the subject has currently activated. RBAC
Hierarchical extends RBAC Core by introducing the ability for roles to inherit
permissions of another role. RBAC Constrained extends RBAC Core and RBAC
Hierarchical by introducing constraints in regards to subjects and roles.
A limitation of the RBAC model is the focus on roles as access rights, which
restricts the ability of a subject to access resources only via the subject’s organ-
isational role(s). This both limits or overly exposes access to a resource since
roles lack the granularity to final control access to resources. Potentially, or-
ganisations may have to create fictitious roles, not representative of the actual
organisational structure, to ensure proper access to resources. In addition, the
RBAC model provides no means to address multi-organisational access control,
where access control is managed between several organisations. As a result, this
could increase the complexity of roles and permission assignments within RBAC
rules, making access more challenging to support.
Many proposals extend RBAC, highlighting not only RBAC’s popularity in
industry, but also in research. Kalam et al. extend RBAC to include the notion of
organisations in Organisation Based Access Control (OrBAC) [35]. Introducing
organisations enables the specification of RBAC rules relevant to an organi-
sation, where there are many sources of authority (SOAs) sharing access, and
enabling organisations (and SOA) to define permissions solely for their own re-
sources. Similar work by Demchenko et al. also address the problems caused
by multiple sources of authority, proposing Role Based Access Control for Dis-
tributed Multidomain Applications (RBAC-DM) [24]. Demchenko et al. high-
lights limitations of RBAC in collaborative environments (containing multiple
SOAs), and addresses them via the use of multi-domain authorisation sessions
(where an RBAC session can span across several organisational domains). Lastly,
Bertino et al.’s GEO-RBAC [21] introduces the notion of location, where a sub-
ject’s geographical location influences the activation of a subject’s assigned roles.
GEO-RBAC addresses the need for spacial aware access control, where subjects
may only access a resource depending on their location.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). Attribute Based Access Con-
trol (ABAC) is a recent development in access control models. There are a
number of proposals [31], critiques [63], and implementations [19,43,52]. ABAC
can be considered a natural progression from the RBAC model, whereby in-
stead of permissions assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to attributes of
a subject, resource, and their environment. An attribute describes some aspect
of their associated entity, such as, a name or user group (for a subject), the
number of active sessions (of a resource), or time of day and location (in the
system’s environment). These attributes can be defined in such a way to create
permissions with a fine granularity of access, where a permission may state that
subjects only from user group ‘HR’ can access a resource with no more than
10 active sessions, between the hours of 9am and 5pm. In addition, ABAC is
seen as a generalisation of RBAC, where RBAC roles are implemented as ABAC
attributes assigned to subjects.
ABAC implementations and proposals have put forward additional criteria
for access control, as opposed to simply replacing the notion of roles in RBAC
with attributes. Notably, environment conditions are considered in order to pro-
vide additional context to a subject’s request for access. For example, a subject
requesting access outside of normal office hours should not be granted access,
despite having the necessary attributes to gain authorisation to the resource.
The inclusion of environment conditions has the ability to expand the criteria
necessary to award access, and further protect an organisation’s resources from
attacks (e.g., credential stealing attacks [66], by blacklisting IP addresses based
on location data observed in the environment).
Sandu has argued that the leap from RBAC roles to the use of attributes
offers a number of benefits [63], highlighting the fact that ABAC unifies many ac-
cess control models, for example, roles (RBAC), location (GEO-RBAC), security
labels (Bell-LaPadula), and access control lists (DAC). However, the resulting
benefits of ABAC come with increased complexity. Organisations now have to
be more specific when utilising ABAC, as access rights could be represented as
anything that might be owned by a subject, resource, or environment. This has
the potential to lead to conflicts, or increased challenges when managing access,
due to no clear representation of an access right.
Implementing Access Control Models. Traditionally, access control models
have been implemented as bespoke components of information systems. Imple-
mentation concerns both ‘authorisation’ being how to capture and express iden-
tities, privileges, and permissions, and ‘access control’, referring to the process
that can render access control decisions. A problem with this approach is the
heterogeneous qualities of resources an organisation may wish to protect, often
requiring each resource (e.g., a web application) to implement its own form of
access control.
A solution to this problem is implementing access control models in a service
orientated way, as demonstrated by the eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage [52]. XACML is a popular standard for implementing ABAC and RBAC
models, and provisions a reference architecture in which to guide implemen-
tation. XACML standardises the way in which identities and permissions are
defined, communicated, and assessed in order for its reference architecture to
render access control decisions. It does this through the use of authorisation
policies (to express identities, privileges, and permissions as ‘attributes’ and
‘rules’), and the use of standardised protocols (e.g., SAML [53]). Authorisation
policies embody the ‘authorisation’ aspect of an access control model, whereas
the protocols support ‘access control’ via retrieval of privileges, and deliverance
of access control decisions.
XACML’s reference architecture describes a set of components that exist to
facilitate access to protected resources. The reference architecture defines a four
tier process to access control: Enforce requests and decisions to access, Decide
upon access, Support retrieval of credentials and policies, and Manage admin-
istration of policies. This process is implemented through a set of conceptual
components that when combined achieves access control (Table 1). These com-
ponents are the enabling factors for controlling access, whereby in real systems
that implement such components, access control can easily be monitored and
managed. A key selling point of the XACML reference architecture is the sep-
aration between access control and resources, where access control primarily
becomes a service that resources and users can rely upon.
Component Description
Policy enforcement point (PEP) Makes access requests and enforces
access decisions
Policy decision point (PDP) Evaluates access requests against policies
to provide access decisions
Policy information point (PIP) Contains subject identity information
(attributes)
Policy retrieval point (PRP) Contains ABAC authorisation policies
to govern access decisions
Policy administration point (PAP) The source of authority / system that
issues access control policies
Table 1. XACML components
The XACML reference architecture has arguably sparked the rise of access
control as a service, where we refer to such solutions as authorisation infrastruc-
tures.
2.2 Authorisation Infrastructures
An authorisation infrastructure [19] is a loose term for a collection of services
and mechanisms that implement an access control model. There are a number of
varying terms for authorisation infrastructures, such as, the ones defined by au-
thentication and authorisation infrastructures (AAIs) [40], XACML’s reference
authorisation architecture [52], and privilege management infrastructures [20].
We adopt the following rather simple definition for authorisation infrastructure.
Definition 3 (Authorisation Infrastructure). Authorisation infrastruc-
tures facilitate the management of identities, privileges and policies, and render
access control decisions.
The key facet of authorisation infrastructures is the use of services that
provide access control external to an organisation’s resources. This implies a
separation of duties between provisioning of services by the resources, and the
assessment of right to access [19,?,?]. Specifically, access control is implemented
by the following key services:
Identity services responsible for the the management of subject access rights,
such as, access rights and subject identifiers.
Authorisation services responsible for the evaluation of access rights against
access control rules, and decision of access.
The combination of both identity services and authorisation services should
conform to an access control model (e.g., RBAC [50]). Based on existing imple-
mentations [19,?,?], identity services may authenticate subjects, and maintain,
assign and release a subject’s access rights (i.e., privileges) to authorisation ser-
vices based on policies (e.g., Shibboleth’s attribute release policy [43]). Examples
of an identity service include directory services, such as, the Lightweight Direc-
tory Access Protocol (LDAP) [38]. Other forms of identity services include cre-
dential issuing services (such as, SimpleSAMLphp [67] and the Shibboleth iden-
tity provider [43]). These types of identity services not only maintain a subject’s
access rights (privileges), but can be configured to decide what access rights can
be issued and released to given services across multiple domains. Authorisation
services may validate and evaluate a subject’s access rights against a set of poli-
cies (e.g., PERMIS’s access control and credential validation policies [3]). Exam-
ples of authorisation services include, the axiomatics policy server [1], PERMIS
standalone authorisation service [3] (both of which utilise the XACML stan-
dard to define access control policies), and the community authorisation service
(CAS) [60].
Figure 1 defines a general model of an authorisation infrastructure that ab-
stracts away from its varying implementations. With reference to the flow of
communication to obtain authorisation, subjects (users) authenticate (1) with a
given identity service that maintains a set of access rights for each subject. The
authenticated subject can then request (2) access to a particular resource. The
resource’s policy enforcement point (PEP) communicates with an authorisation
service (3), which can first validate (4) the subject’s set of access rights, and then
decide upon access. The authorisation service sends a response back to the PEP
with a message indicating whether authorisation should be granted or denied
(5).
Fig. 1. General authorisation infrastructure model
As already mentioned, authorisation infrastructures rely on policies to derive
access control decisions. Authorisation infrastructures may utilise a variety of
policy types, where an instance of a policy type will express rules relevant to
a particular service within an authorisation infrastructure. For example, poli-
cies within authorisation services are used to define the constraints of access
(i.e., RBAC role permission assignments), whereas policies and subject attribute
repositories (e.g., LDAP [38]) within identity services contain or define what sub-
jects have in terms of assigned access. With this in mind, there are four types of
authorisation policies, which are defined as follows.
Access Control Policy. An access control policy specifies the security controls
of what credentials a subject must own in order to gain access to a set
of protected resources, what obligations they must conform to, and what
conditions they must meet.
Credential Validation Policy. A credential validation policy defines what
credentials an identity service is trusted to issue.
Delegation Issuing Policy. A delegation issuing policy defines the trust in
the extent of access a subject can delegate unto others.
Credential/Attribute Release Policy. A credential/attribute release policy
defines what information an identity service will release on behalf of a subject
to any requesting authorisation services or resources.
Associated with policies and access rights is the notion of source of authority
(SOA) and issuer [19]. A source of authority is the owner of a resource that
establishes the rules of access (as policies) to their resources. An issuer is the
identity service or person responsible for issuing to a subject a set of access
rights, which are either stored in an attribute repository as unsigned or signed
attributes [32], or are generated at time of request [53].
Lastly, an additional quality of authorisation infrastructures is the ability to
operate in federated environments (i.e., components of an authorisation infras-
tructure become component systems managed across multiple organisations).
This is often referred to as federated identity management, or federated access
control [24,31,35,70], and enables the sharing of access across multiple manage-
ment domains (organisations). Various access control models are suitable for
federated access control, demonstrated by several implementations [19,43,67].
Figure 2 conveys a high level overview of a federated environment, containing
a service provider (SP) organisation and several identity provider (IdPs) organ-
isations. An SP organisation offers access to their protected resources, whereas
IdP organisations consume access to those protected resources. Subject identi-
ties managed by an identity provider component system can be assigned a set of
attributes that are stored within an identity service (e.g., simpleSAMLphp [67]).
Subjects can use their attributes to gain access to a SP’s resources given that
the SP trusts the IdP. To control the release of attributes, some IdPs may define
attribute release policies [43] to prevent certain types of information from being
released to service providers. The service provider ultimately decides upon access
through the use of authorisation services (which provide access control decisions
local to the organisation).
Fig. 2. Conceptual view of a federated authorisation infrastructure
2.3 Static and Dynamic Access Control
We have seen how access control is a key element when implementing authorisa-
tion infrastructures. However, one thing not addressed is the distinction between
traditional (static) approaches to access control, to more recent (dynamic) ad-
vanced approaches. In a static approach to access control, a user’s access rights
are assessed against a set of security controls in order to determine access (e.g.,
RBAC [50]). This is limited since at time of access no additional context is as-
sessed, such as, the user’s historical access, their location, time of day, or other
external factors. With this in mind, static approaches are presumptuous in that,
should a user have the necessary access rights, they should be awarded access.
Arguably, it is not always the case that access should be granted despite the
user owning the necessary access rights. As such, there is a growing focus on
dynamic approaches to access control that allow organisations to define a finer
grain of control over access in response to varying risks, threats, and environment
states. The definitions for static and dynamic access control are as follows.
Definition 4 (Static Access Control). Static access control refers to the
evaluation of a subject’s access rights against a set of immutable authorisation
policies for deciding the subject’s access to a resource, regaess of the context in
which the request is made and evaluated.
Definition 5 (Dynamic Access Control). Dynamic access control refers to
the evaluation of a subject’s access rights against a set of authorisation policies
for deciding the subject’s access to a resource, taking into account the context in
which the request is made and evaluated.
Dynamic access control differs from static access control because it is capable
of employing various security controls that are related to changes in the state of
the environment or protected resources, and user activity. As such, an authori-
sation policy may contain a diverse set of access control rules to accommodate
a wide variety of scenarios (e.g., a rise in national security threat levels [41]).
Appropriate access control rules are applied to requests for access in a mutually
exclusive manner, given the context (i.e., state of the environment, such as, user
activity or time of day) that surrounds the request.
The overall goal of dynamic access control is to reduce human intervention,
make access control more responsive to attacks, and more cost effective. Sev-
eral techniques have been proposed, including, resource usage [57], temporal
properties [34], risk [41], and trust [12,65]. For example, in usage control [57] a
perception of user activity is maintained over time and evaluated against thresh-
olds of usage (e.g., a staff member may not print more than 100 pages per day),
alongside traditional access control rules (e.g., a user must be assigned the role
of staff to print). Additionally, ABAC can be seen as a dynamic access control
model given its ability to define permissions that can be valid for a multitude of
system states.
2.4 Self-adaptive Authorisation Infrastructures
With the goal of reducing human intervention, self-adaptation can be incorpo-
rated into existing authorisation infrastructures, thus enabling these infrastruc-
tures to manage themselves, at run-time, the definition of authorisation poli-
cies and process of access control. In particular, the focus of this paper is how
self-adaptation can be integrated with authorisation infrastructures, and how
authorisation infrastructures can self-protect against insider threats.
Self-adaptation. Self-adaptation enables a system to adjust itself in response
to changes that might affect itself or its environment. Self-adaptive systems can
be defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Self-Adaptive Systems [22]). “Systems that are able to mod-
ify their behaviour and/or structure in response changes that occur to the system
itself, its environment, or even its goals.”
Although there are several reference models for self-adaptive sys-
tems [36,39,56], most of them share the common use of a feedback loop [15,25,29].
In this paper, we adopt as a feedback control loop, the Monitor, Analyse, Plan,
Execute - Knowledge (MAPE-K) reference model [36], as shown in Figure 3.
In this diagram, the main feedback control loop, which embodies the stages of
the MAPE-K reference model, observes (via probes) and adapts (via effectors)
a target system. The Monitor stage enables to obtain the state of the target
system and its environment. The Analyse stage analyses the state of the target
system and its environment in order, first, to decide whether adaptation should
be triggered (Solution Domain), and second, to identify the appropriate courses
of action in case adaptation is required (Problem Domain). The Plan stage, first,
selects amongst alternative course of action those that are the most appropriate
(Decision Maker), and second, generates the plans that will realise the selected
course of action (Plan Synthesis). The Execute stage executes the plans that
deploy the course of action for adapting the system. Finally, Knowledge repre-
sents any information related to the perceived state of the target system and
environment that enables the provision of self-adaptation.
Applying the MAPE-K reference model, we view an authorisation infras-
tructure as the target system, and all the rest, including the users and protected
resources, as the environment. The role of a controller5 seeks to monitor both the
target system and the environment in which to drive changes at run-time within
the authorisation infrastructure. With this in mind, self-adaptation is capable of
extending traditional approaches to access control, where such approaches be-
come capable to respond to unplanned states, evolve to changing user needs, and
maintain assurances in confidentiality, integrity, and availability of resources.
5 Also referred to as the self-adaptive layer.
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Fig. 3. Modified version of the MAPE-K reference model for autonomic computing [36].
Self-adaptive authorisation and self-adaptive access control. Self-
adaptive authorisation has already been proposed by Bailey et al [5,6,7], where
legacy based authorisation infrastructures have been shown to mitigate, at run-
time, attacks via the adaptation of authorisation (e.g., adaptation of authori-
sation policies and subject privileges). We define self-adaptive authorisation as
follows.
Definition 7 (Self-Adaptive Authorisation). Self-adaptive authorisation
refers to the run-time adaptation of the specification of whether a subject has
access to resources.
The incorporation of self-adaptation into authorisation has highlighted a
number of challenges that this paper aims to address, including the engineering of
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures, and practicalities of operating such
systems at run-time. First, it is important to identify the differences between
static approaches to access control (i.e., traditional, such as, RBAC), dynamic
approaches (i.e., adaptive, such as, risk based), and self-adaptive ones.
Let us consider a subject requesting access to a resource outside of normal
working hours, who then abuses such access in order to jeopardise the confiden-
tiality of a resource. A static approach (i.e., static access control) will evaluate
access based on purely the subject’s access rights alone, without considering the
time of day, or the subject’s activity. A dynamic approach (i.e., dynamic access
control) may select, from a pre-existing set of access control rules, a rule ap-
plicable for that time of day, using environmental attributes and the subject’s
access rights. On the other hand, a self-adaptive approach may, at run-time,
generate, modify, or remove the active set of access control rules (e.g., deploying
a new authorisation policy, or revoking a set of user access rights) should a user
be detected while abusing their access rights outside of normal working hours.
Additionally, modifications instructed by a self-adaptive approach are based on
a maintained perception of state of its target system and its environment.
Self-adaptive authorisation alone has some limitations. Specifically, it is lim-
ited to only mitigating attacks (e.g., insider threats) within the boundaries of an
authorisation infrastructure’s implemented access control model, where adapta-
tion is primarily parametric. Should services of an authorisation infrastructure
suffer an attack, or the implemented access control model becomes vulnerable,
an additional scope of adaptation is needed. As such, it is important to address
the possibility of self-adaptive access control, which we define as follows.
Definition 8 (Self-Adaptive Access Control). Self-adaptive access control
refers to the run-time adaptation of the enforcement of authorisation by control-
ling the subject’s access to a resource.
Environment
Controller
Authorisation Infrastructure
Self-adaptive Authorisation
Controller
Self-adaptive Access Control
Authorisation
Policies
Access Control
ModelsConforms
Fig. 4. Self-adaptive authorisation and self-adaptive access control
Figure 4 emphasises the marriage of self-adaptive authorisation and self-
adaptive access control, which allow us to mitigate attacks more effectively and
efficiently, depending on the type of attack observed. Authorisation being the
collection of policies that govern access, and access control being the process in
how an access decision is achieved. From the diagram, we can see a distributed
control topology of two controllers operating together in mitigating potential at-
tacks originating from the environment of the authorisation infrastructure. The
controller associated with self-adaptive authorisation observes activity of the au-
thorisation infrastructure and its environment in order to gain a perception of
malicious behaviour with relevance to the current state of authorisation policies.
Should malicious behaviour be observed, this controller can adjust deployed au-
thorisation policies to mitigate attacks. Similarly, the controller associated with
self-adaptive access control may observe the authorisation infrastructure and
its environment in order to identify if the current state of the employed access
control model is fit for purpose. For example, external threats may warrant ad-
ditional steps in validating subject credentials, and as such, the controller may
deploy credential validation services [19] between policy decision and policy en-
forcement points [52]. Based on the above, we define self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructures as follows.
Definition 9 (Self-Adaptive Authorisation Infrastructure). Self-
adaptive authorisation infrastructures refer to the run-time adaptation of the
collection of authorisation policies and their enforcement.
Self-protection. Self-protection is of particular relevance since the goal of this
work is to manage access control in order to mitigate abuse of access. Self-
protecting systems can be defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Self-Protecting System [75]). “Self-protecting systems are
a class of autonomic systems capable of detecting and mitigating security threats
at run-time.”
There are various self-protective solutions that seek to detect and mitigate
malicious behaviour. However, few works exist that are able to concretely address
self-protection with a view to mitigate the abuse of access. Whilst many sys-
tems appear to be self-protective, such as, intrusion response systems [44,69,?],
many are only adaptive and lack an awareness of ‘self’. A self-protecting sys-
tem is clearly demonstrated by Yuan et al.’s architectural based self-protection
framework [76], where a system maintains a modelled state of its own system
architecture in which to guide mitigation of threats.
2.5 Insider Threats
Insider threat refers to an organisation’s risk of attack by their own users or em-
ployees. It is fast becoming a prominent topic that organisations need to address,
as highlighted by recent scandals in the media [8,14,71]. This is particularly rel-
evant to access control, where the active management of authorisation has the
potential to mitigate and prevent users from abusing their own access rights to
carry out attacks. The CERT Guide to Insider Threats (Cappelli et al.) [16]
defines malicious insider threats as the following.
Definition 11 (Insider Threat [16]). “A malicious insider threat is a current
or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorised
access to an organisation’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded
or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the organisation’s information or information sys-
tems.”
Capelli et al. [16] classify three types of insider threat: sabotage, where ma-
licious users attempt to damage or corrupt organisational resources, theft of
intellectual property, where organisational resources are stolen and distributed,
and fraud, where activity is covered up or information is used to commit crimes,
such as, falsifying money transfers.
A common characteristic of insider threat is that malicious insiders utilise
their knowledge of their organisation’s systems, and their assigned access rights,
to conduct attacks. This places a malicious insider in a fortuitous position,
whereby the insider (as an authorised user) can cause far greater damage than
an external attacker, simply due to their access rights [17]. Such form of attack
is representative of the attacks that many organisations consider to be most vul-
nerable from, being the abuse of privileged access rights by the employees of an
organisation [55].
Unless additional measures are put into place, malicious insiders can abuse
existing security measures, where current approaches fail to robustly adapt
and respond to the unpredictable nature of users. For example, traditional ap-
proaches to access control assume that if a user has authenticated, and has the
required access rights, access to resources should be given. Whilst there are a
number of novel techniques that enable the detection of insider threat [2,51,68],
there is little research that utilises such techniques within an automated set-
ting. Many existing approaches require analysis by human agents to identify
and execute resultant actions to mitigating attacks.
3 Case Study
In this section, we present a case study to illustrate the challenges in self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructures, discussed in this paper. The case study is based
on a subset of the NIST Smart Grid Cybersecurity specification [46].
3.1 The NIST Smart Grid Cybersecurity Specification
The NIST IR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity [46] is an advi-
sory report “intended to facilitate each organization’s efforts to develop a cyber
security strategy effectively focused on prevention, detection, response, and re-
covery” [45], in the context of the transformation of the US electricity system
into a smart grid. The report was released in three volumes: “Smart Grid Cy-
ber Security Strategy, Architecture, and High-Level Requirements” [47], “Privacy
and the Smart Grid” [48], and “Supportive Analyses and References” [49].
The first volume presents a high-level overview of the proposed framework,
together with high-level security requirements. The report identifies 49 actors
(including energy providers, customers, regulators, etc.) involved in the Smart
Grid, and defines 22 logical interface categories, over 7 domains. The domains
are transmission, bulk generation, operations, distribution, marketing, service
provider, and customer. Due to the wide scope of the specification and its very
high-level nature, we focused on a small subset of the framework, and constructed
a more detailed architecture and requirements when necessary.
3.2 Smart Grid Cybersecurity: A Self-adaptive Authorization
Infrastructure
The case study is centred around the Customer Energy Management System
(EMS), an actor in the customer domain described as “an application service or
device that communicates with devices in the home. The application service or
device may have interfaces to the meter to read usage data or to the operations
domain to get pricing or other information to make automated or manual deci-
sions to control energy consumption more efficiently. The EMS may be a utility
subscription service, a third-party offered service, a consumer-specific policy, a
consumer-owned device, or a manual control by the utility or customer” [47].
In this case study, we assume a certain level of automation for the EMS, as an
entirely manual control would not fit the purpose of our work.
The framework defines only the logical interfaces between the EMS and other
actors in the customer, operations and service provider domains. Therefore, the
scope of our case study will be restricted to those domains and actors, and only
to the extend relevant to the operation of the EMS. The choice of the EMS,
as the main focus of our case study, stems from the ability to involve a variety
of possible scenarios involving several third-parties. Since the EMS has to deal
with data flowing to and from those third-parties, as well as, to keep the data
safe from unauthorised access, it is a good candidate for a case study focused on
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures.
Actors The following actors from the Smart Grid Cyber Security Specifica-
tion [47] interact with the EMS, and are relevant to the case study:
Customer Appliances and Equipment: “A device or instrument designed
to perform a specific function, especially an electrical device, such as a
toaster, for household use. An electric appliance or machinery that may have
the ability to be monitored, controlled, and/or displayed.”
Customer Distributed Energy Resources (DER): Generation and Storage:
“Energy generation resources, such as solar or wind, used to generate and
store energy (located on a customer site) [...]”
Meter: “Point of sale device used for the transfer of product and measuring
usage from one domain/system to another.”
Customer Premise Display: “A device that enables customers to view their
usage and cost data within their home or business.”
Customer Information System: “Enterprise-wide software applications that
allow companies to manage aspects of their relationship with a customer.”
The EMS maintains authorisation policies that determine which actors can
access which data, and under which conditions. Throughout the paper, the case
study will be used to illustrate various self-adaptation techniques that can be
applied to the adaptation authorisation policies.
Goals The system protects sensitive information, and allows selected actors to
access some of that information. The goals of the system, at a high level, are the
typical CIA properties:
Confidentiality: the system must guarantee that the data it protects cannot be
used by a malicious subject. The system must also guarantee that legitimate
users cannot use their privileges to access information that they are not
meant to be able to access.
Integrity: the system must make sure that the data and commands it protects
cannot be compromised.
Availability: the system must ensure that the data and commands are pro-
tected against malicious subjects that would try to make the system inac-
cessible.
The high level goals of the system are refined in the scenarios below (Sec-
tions 3.3 to 3.3).
Initial State of the System The system, in its initial state, involves the
following actors:
Customer energy management system (EMS): a self-adaptive software
system, running in the household, owned and controlled by the couple, that
interfaces with all the actors below. The system exposes an API that allows
authorised applications and web services to access data produced by the
other actors, or to issue commands to said actors.
Customer appliances and equipment: an air conditioning unit, a water
boiler, a thermostat, and an CCTV camera. They are all connected to a
local network.
Customer Distributed Energy Resources (DER): solar panels, that can
produce electricity. The electricity used can either be used in the household,
fed to the grid, or wasted.
Meter: a smart meter, that can be queried remotely.
Customer premise display: an application running on the couple’s smart-
phones.
Customer information system: the software system, running on the energy
retailer’s infrastructure, that allows the household to access, in real-time,
data on their energy consumption, as well as information of whether, and
when, they are allowed to feed energy to the grid.
The default authorisation policies, deployed on the EMS, can be summarised
as follows:
– the EMS can read the temperature and humidity in the household from the
thermostat;
– the EMS can turn the AC unit on and off, and switch it between the cooling
and heating modes;
– the EMS can turn the water boiler on and off, and read the temperature of
the water in the tank from the boiler’s sensor;
– the EMS can find out the location of each member of the household, by
querying their smartphones’ location service;
– the EMS can read the real-time energy production from the solar panels;
– the EMS can query the meter to find out the current energy consumption;
– the EMS can feed data to the customer premise display;
– no third party apps or services are allowed to read or write any information
from or to the EMS;
– the EMS can get real-time and historical data from the customer information
system;
– the Customer Premise Displays (CPD) app running on the couple’s smart-
phones have read and write access to a range of data from the EMS, and
can issue commands to the connected devices in the household;
– the customer information system can access the household’s meter data at
all times.
3.3 Scenarios
First Scenario: A Compromised Service The first scenario deals with com-
promised third party services, and the resulting risk of misuse of credentials.
In this scenario, the couple subscribes to an online service that uses their loca-
tion to automatically regulate the heating system in their home, as well as the
amount of hot water available. The application requires read access to the cou-
ple’s locations (through their smartphones’ location service), read access to the
thermostat and water boiler data, and write access to the AC/heating unit, and
water boiler. By using the service, the couple’s goal is to minimise their energy
bill, while still enjoying hot water and room temperature between 19-21◦C when
home. The service should analyse the data it collects, and infer the best times
to turn the AC/heating unit and the water boiler on and off.
The specific authorisation goals for this scenarios are the following:
– the system must ensure that the data is only collected by the third-party
service in a secure way, through an encrypted channel, and using state of
the art authentication protocols.
– the system must monitor access to the data in order to detect any misuse.
In particular, it must ensure that patterns of read and write requests do not
suddenly change, which may indicate a compromised service.
We can envisage a scenario in which, after a few months on continuous use,
the service gets compromised, and starts issuing commands to the water boiler
and the AC/heating unit that do not achieve the goals. Furthermore, getting
location, water temperature and house temperature reading allows the attackers
to infer details about the couple’s habits and movements. The erratic behaviour
of the service is detected, the service’s credentials are temporarily revoked, and
the users are notified of the incident.
Second Scenario: Intrusive Energy Retailer In the second scenario, the
energy retailer is potentially threatening the couple’s privacy. The company has
read access to the couple’s meter for billing their energy use. However, if the en-
ergy retailer queries the meter too often, it may be able to infer patterns about
the couple’s life. By “too often”, we mean more than necessary for the opera-
tion of the service, and sufficiently to be able to make conjectures that would
threaten the couple’s privacy, such as the study of their movements or habits.
The frequency of making a query threatens the couple’s privacy for different
reasons. It could be the energy retailer’s policy to snoop on its customers, but it
could also be that the energy retailer’s infrastructure was compromised, either
by an internal agent (such as a disgruntled employee) or by an external entity
(such as a competitor or a spying agency).
The specific authorisation goals for this scenario are the same as for the first
scenario. Instead of the third party, the queries are made by the energy retailer.
As the system is running, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure even-
tually detects that the energy retailer queries the meter too often, and chooses
to reduce the number of times the energy retailer can query the meter every day,
in order protect the couple’s privacy. The users are also notified of the incident.
Third Scenario: Data Deletion The third scenario deals with integrity is-
sues. In this scenario, the authorisation infrastructure monitors the use of the
Customer Premise Displays (CPD) app. Part of the CPD app functionality is
to allow the couple to selectively delete some data, such as their location at a
certain point in time, either for privacy reasons, because of errors in the location
data, or because they do not want some unusual data points to be taken into
account in the decisions taken by the third party service described in the first
scenario.
The specific authorisation goal for this scenario is the following extension of
the integrity goal:
– the authorisation infrastructure must prevent malicious data destruction, by
monitoring the usage of the CPD apps for pattern of suspicious behaviour,
such as the deletion of vast quantities of data within a short time frame.
Once suspicious behaviour is detected by the authorisation infrastructure, the
CPD app’s credentials are then revoked, and the users are notified. Furthermore,
due to the wide access to data given to the CPD apps, they are required to follow
a strict security protocol in order for the CPD app to regain its credentials.
Fourth Scenario: Stolen Credentials The last scenario deals with stolen
credentials, where an unauthorised subject managed to impersonate a legitimate
subject to access the system. Depending on the legitimate subject’s credentials,
such a scenario can threaten any or all of the CIA goals.
The specific authorisation goals for this scenario are the following:
– the authorisation infrastructure must detect the impersonation of legitimate
credentials;
– the authorisation infrastructure must ban subjects impersonating legitimate
users, and force the victims to reset their credentials securely.
In this scenario, a malicious subject manages to steal the couple’s credentials,
and uses them to access the CPD app. The authorisation infrastructure detects
that, while the couple is currently located on one continent, a new connection
seems to originate from a different continent. The authorisation infrastructure
then automatically shuts down the malicious subject’s access, as well as the
access for the legitimate subject whose credentials were stolen. The legitimate
subject then has to reset their password from an administration console provided
by the EMS, which is only available from the household’s local network.
4 Related Work
In this section, we review some related work in the context of detection and
mitigation of insider threat. Specifically, we discuss current approaches from
three different solution areas. These being dynamic access control, intrusion
detection, and self-protection. As such, it is intended to demonstrate the benefits
and limitations of each solution area in mitigating insider threat, whilst arguing
self-adaptation as a promising approach.
4.1 Mitigation through Dynamic Access Control
Approaches to dynamic access control [12,13,33,57] are viewed as solutions to
mitigating insider threat, due to their ability to enforce appropriate security con-
trols given the state of the environment. Observation of changes in environment
state, such as, a rise in threat to national security [41], a dynamic access control
approach will select an appropriate security control from a pre-defined set of
controls, in order to mitigate attacks. In the following, we discuss several no-
table approaches in dynamic access control, and their ability to mitigate insider
attacks.
Usage Control (UCON) [57] builds upon traditional access control models
whereby obligations and conditions are used to assess a subject’s usage of a
resource, as part of an access decision. A novel aspect of UCON is its ability
to capture a subject’s state within a resource, and use this as a contributing
factor within the access decision. Whilst the UCON model is sophisticated in
identifying and managing a subject’s usage, it only allows for a transient solu-
tion to managing insider threat. For example, a subject could invalidate usage
requirements for a particular resource, but go on to access other resources de-
spite being seen as a threat. In addition, the UCON approach to access control
has the potential to become complex because usage rules woven with traditional
access control rules on a per resource basis.
A step forward from usage is the inclusion of trust and reputation when
generating an access control decision, via a Trust Policy Decision Point [13]. Here,
a weighting of trust is calculated based on the usage or feedback from resources,
providing additional context to a subject’s usage. Serrano et al. [65] explores
trust management to achieve access control. Within trust management, subjects
and protected resources are given a level of trust, calculated from dimensions,
such as, past behaviour of the subject, the access rights they already own, the
issuer of access rights, and feedback from other subjects/resource owners.
In a similar work by Bistarelli et al. [12], a formal framework for trust policy
negotiation is proposed. In contrast to Serrano et al. [65], access is awarded
through the reasoning of access control policies, and a trust level generated
from a subject’s given set of credentials. An interesting aspect of Bistarelli et
al. work is that not all subjects will know the required credentials for access.
Therefore, they propose an additional control that notifies the subject of the
required credentials, providing the subject is deemed trustworthy. This adds an
extra level of security, preventing the access requirements from being revealed
unnecessarily, as they could be abused by a malicious subject.
There are other dynamic approaches specialised in expressing access control
rules with a set of temporal constraints. For instance [33], access control policies
contain a set of branch like rules, which are relevant to a set of system states.
Given a state that conforms to a temporal constraint or one that exhibits a par-
ticular event, access control mechanisms are constrained to a branch of relevant
access control rules. This approach to enabling dynamic access control (along
with the aforementioned) is defined as dynamic policies.
In summary, approaches to dynamic access control are capable of mitigating
insider attacks, which is achieved through actively selecting appropriate secu-
rity controls depending on the environment. However, these approaches share
a common limitation: it is necessary to maintain a comprehensive set of se-
curity controls in order to accommodate all potential risks of abuse. As such,
dynamic access control is seen as an improvement on traditional approaches to
access control, but lack robustness regarding deployments that may fail to offer
the necessary (and appropriate) security control, in light of attack. In addition,
dynamic access control requires fine grained security controls prescribed to par-
ticular states, which may prevent legitimate users from gaining access (due to
constraints over time of access, or location) in order to prevent the prospect of
malicious behaviour. Finally, given that security controls are bounded to par-
ticular states (e.g., time of day), approaches are open to potential subterfuge
where prevention of access is viewed as a transitive measure that could be over-
come. For example, if a subject abuses their credentials, from the viewpoint of
a system administrator, one would expect that malicious subject’s ability to ac-
cess is removed entirely, whereas a dynamic access control approach may only
temporarily prevent access (e.g., due to the time of day).
4.2 Mitigation through Intruder Detection, Response, and
Prevention
Intrusion detection systems are an established method of identifying and alerting
system administrators to anomalous and malicious behaviour within a network.
For detecting anomalous activity, they use a mixture of signature based rules
based on known patterns of malicious packets over a network [62], and machine
learning techniques [72]. Whilst typically positioned for the detection of exter-
nal attackers, recent works have demonstrated their use in detecting anomalous
activity by malicious insiders [11].
Intrusion detection alone is limited by a strong reliance on human adminis-
trators interpreting alerts and actively responding to alerts in order to mitigate
insider attacks. Several works aim to improve upon this limitation through au-
tomated response to attacks, and the ability to prevent attacks from even hap-
pening. These are known as intrusion response systems (IRSs), and intrusion
prevention systems (IPSs), respectively.
Intrusion response systems (IRSs) [18] work alongside intrusion detection
systems to automatically respond to raised alerts. Given the identification of
certain types of attacks or alerts, an IRS will select a pre-determined response
in order to mitigate any potential attacks. Many of these approaches rely on a
static decision making approach, such as Mu et al.’s [44] approach based on a
hierarchical planning of responses (adaptations). IRSs are capable in mitigating
many forms of network based attacks, through both structural and parametric
adaptation. Example adaptations include the reconfiguration of network devices,
adaptation of firewall policies, and throttling bandwidth to networked devices.
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) [27] build upon IRSs, but sit within a
network. Rather than act on alerts, they actively monitor network traffic and
perform adaptations as attacks occur. IPSs have several advantages over IRSs.
Specifically, they relate to the timeliness in mitigating attacks without relying
on the input from external systems (i.e., IDSs). This in turn widens the scope
of adaptations an IPS can perform over an IRS. For example, an IPS is capable
of immediately mitigating network based attacks through dropping or altering
malicious packets in transit, or resetting network connections.
The advantage of an IRS and IPS solution is the ability to respond and pre-
vent unauthorised and external attacks, where many adaptations involve changes
to architecture (structural) or firewall rules (parametric). IRSs and IPSs share
similarities with self-adaptive approaches, yet are not explicitly classed as self-
adaptive. A key distinction to this is the lack of reasoning about ‘self’, where
many IRSs respond to alerts without considering the current state of the system
and its environment. Whilst both approaches are capable in mitigating attacks
via adaptation, it is important for such systems to maintain an awareness of
system state before and after adaptation. This would allow for the selection
of optimal adaptations that can be evaluated against the current state, whilst
providing assurances against adaptations that may cause greater damage to an
organisation as opposed to allowing an attack to continue.
With respect to the mitigation of insider attacks, whilst IRSs and IPSs are
well positioned to mitigating both internal and external behaviour, they are
limited in mitigating attacks only at the network layer. Internal attacks prolific
of malicious insiders arguably offer different traits to that of external attackers
intruding into a network, where there is a greater challenge in understanding the
context of an insider’s activity within a network, as well as their activity beyond
the network layer.
Finally, one aspect of IRSs and IPSs that can benefit a self-adaptive approach
is the use of dynamic decision making in selecting responses (adaptations). For
example, some IRSs and IPSs make use of dynamic decision making in select-
ing adaptations to mitigate attacks. Stakhanova et al. [69] propose a dynamic
decision making approach for IRSs where an IRS will analyse the results of a
response to raised alerts. The success or failure of a response is then factored into
future decisions. Ultimately, this can be extended to consider potential changes
in perception of malicious or anomalous behaviour.
4.3 Mitigation through Self-protection
Self-protecting systems are a specialisation of self-adaptive systems with a goal
to mitigating malicious behaviour. In the following, we discuss the few works
that have demonstrated self-protection within the context of mitigating insider
attacks. In particular, we discuss two self-protection approaches based on the
state of access control, and one approach based on the state system architecture.
One of the approaches to self-protection via access control is SecuriTAS [59].
SecuriTAS is a tool that enables dynamic decisions in awarding access, which
is based on a perceived state of the system and its environment. SecuriTAS is
similar to dynamic access control approaches, such as RADac [41], in that it has
a notion of risk (threat) to resources, and changes in threat leads to a change
in access control decisions. However, it furthers the concepts in RADac to in-
clude the notion of utility, whereby given a perceived state of the system and
its environment, the optimum set of security controls are used. This is achieved
through an autonomic controller that updates and analyses a set of models (that
define system objectives and vulnerabilities, threats to the system, and impor-
tance of resources in terms of a cost value) at run-time. The autonomic controller
deploys optimal security controls (i.e., access control constraints) within the sys-
tem, changing the conditions of access. A novel aspect of this work is that it is
aimed towards physical security, whereby a resource (e.g., a computer terminal
or hand held device) is stored within an office (also considered to be a resource),
for example. SecuriTAS may change the conditions of access to the office based
on the presence of high cost resources, or the presence of highly authorised staff.
Another form of self-protection in access control is positioned by SAAF [6], a
Self-adaptive Authorisation Framework. SAAF’s goal is to make existing autho-
risation infrastructures self-adaptable, where an organisation can benefit from
the properties of dynamic access control without the need to adopt new access
control models. This is achieved through a globally centralised autonomic con-
troller that monitors the distributed services of an authorisation infrastructure
to build a modelled state of access at run-time (i.e., deployed access control rules,
assigned subject privileges, and protected resources). Malicious user behaviour
observed by a SAAF controller is mitigated through the generation and deploy-
ment of authorisation policies at run-time, preventing any identified abuse from
continuing. Adaptation at the model layer enables assurances and verification
that abuse can no longer continue. In addition, model transformation has been
shown to generate authorisation policies from an abstract model of access. This
has the potential to enable the generation of policies specific to many different
implementations of access control.
The main difference between SecuriTAS and SAAF, is that SecuriTAS posi-
tions its own bespoke access control model and authorisation infrastructure that
incorporates self-adaptation by design. SAAF, on the other hand, is a framework
that describes how existing access control models and authorisation infrastruc-
tures can be made self-adaptive, and as such, configured to actively mitigate
insider threat. With that said, both approaches demonstrate an authorisation
infrastructure’s robustness in mitigating insider attacks, by ensuring that au-
thorisation remains relevant to system and environment states (and preventing
continuation of attacks by adaptation of security controls).
In contrast to self-protection via access control, architectural-based self-
protection (ABSP) [76] presents a general solution to detection and mitigation
of security threats, via run-time structural adaptation. Rather than reason at
the contextual layer of ‘access control’, ABSP utilises an architectural model of
the running system to identify the extent of impact of identified attacks. Once
attacks or security threats have been assessed, a self-adaptive architectural man-
ager (Rainbow [28]) is used to perform adaptations to mitigate the attack. One
adaptation example the approach offers is to throttle network connections to a
server, in order to disrupt ongoing attacks. Another example is the deployment
of application guards where a protective wrapper is deployed around architec-
tural components (e.g., a web server). These provide mitigation measures that
improve upon the integrity of architectural components (i.e., the encryption of
session ids susceptible to hijacking). ABSP shares a number of similarities with
intrusion response and prevention systems, particularly with the scope of adap-
tations that ABSP can perform (e.g., structural adaptation against network
devices and connections). However, because ABSP maintains a notion of ‘self’,
it is able to reason about the impact of adaptations and provide assurance over
adaptation before adapting its target system.
5 Self-Adaptive Authorisation Infrastructures
In this section, in order to provide a basis for engineering self-adaptive autho-
risation infrastructures, we map our perception of self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructures to the modelling dimensions for self-adaptive software systems,
as described by Andersson et al. [4]. To clarify this mapping, examples will be
taken from the case study’s scenarios introduced in Section 3. A summary of the
mapping is presented in Table 2.
5.1 Goals
Evolution The main goals of the authorisation infrastructure, e.g., confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability, are inclined to be static, though they may change
Table 2. Summary of modelling dimensions for self-adaptive authorisation infrastruc-
tures
Dimension Degree
Goals
evolution dynamic (main goals) or specific (specific goals)
flexibility rigid (main goals) or unconstrained (specific goals)
duration persistent (main goals), persistent temporary (specific goals)
multiplicity multiple
dependency independent or dependent
Change
source internal or external
type functional, non-functional or technological
frequency rare or frequent
anticipation foreseen, foreseeable or unforeseen
Mechanisms
type parametric
autonomy mostly autonomous, but sometimes assisted
organisation centralised
scope local or global
duration short, medium or long
timeliness best effort
triggering event-triggered
Effects
criticality harmless to mission-critical
predictability deterministic
overhead insignificant to failure
resilience ideally resilient, but this is hard to achieve
during the infrastructure lifetime. This is the case when tradeoffs between goals
need to resolved, which may require the renegotiation of some of the main goals.
However, specific goals may be more dynamic. For example, the goals in the
first scenario (Section 3.3) pertain to protecting the infrastructure against mis-
use by the third party service. These goals are only valid from the moment the
household subscribes to the service, until they end their subscription.
Flexibility Some of the main goals are rigid, as they prescribe that the in-
frastructure must preserve confidentiality and integrity, for example. However,
some specific goals may be constrained or unconstrained. The third scenario
(Section 3.3) provides a constrained goal, which is that the infrastructure should
detect and act upon when the integrity of the data is compromised. Uncon-
strained goal are not fixed: they may be defined on a range of acceptable values,
or as a particular situation that must be handled, but without specifying how
it should be handled. The fourth scenario (Section 3.3) provides an example of
an unconstrained goal, where the availability of the services that are neither
mission- nor safety-critical should only be guaranteed according to a best-effort
strategy. The goal does not define a minimal acceptable availability value, nor
does it explicitly state how the goal should be satisfied.
Duration The main goals are persistent, as no breach in integrity or confi-
dentiality should be tolerated. However, once again, specific goals may be either
persistent or temporary. The first scenario provides temporary goals, in the sense
that they are only valid whilst the service has access to the system, which can
be revoked or granted at any time.
Multiplicity The system has multiple goals. There are the three main goals,
availability, integrity, and confidentiality, which are common to all self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructures. There are also the specific goals described in the
case study scenarios, that are specific to each system or each deployment.
Dependency The dependency between goals vary. For example, the confiden-
tiality and integrity goals are independent. However, there is a dependency be-
tween the confidentiality and availability goals, as well as between the integrity
and availability goals. A system enforcing maximum availability may permit all
requests, which would harm both the confidentiality and integrity goals. The
goals in the second scenario (Section 3.3) mandate that the system must be pro-
tected against misuse by a third party service. These goals are complementary,
and they also complement the confidentiality goal.
5.2 Change
Source The source of change in self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures can
be external, internal, or both. A self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure that
uses intrusion detection techniques will monitor external changes, while a system
that monitors users for patterns of misbehaviour will monitor internal changes.
In the fourth scenario (Section 3.3), the detection that the geographical location
from which request is made to access the CPD is different from the location in
which the couple is known to be will be an external change. On the other hand,
in the third scenario (Section 3.3), the detection of suspicious behaviour by the
authorised CPD user will be triggered by internal changes, because it is likely
the access logs on the EMS that will be monitored.
Type Non-functional changes can be exemplified by the case of policy updates,
such as the removal of the energy saving service’s credentials when a confidential-
ity breach is detected in the first scenario. Functional changes can also happen
when a new goal is incorporated into the system, for example when a new service
is connected to the system, as in the first scenario. Finally, technological changes
can also happen, if the system is able to change its policy language, or the policy
evaluation engine, for example, when a security notice is issued for the running
software.
Frequency The frequency of changes also varies widely depending on the type of
change, and depending on the threats that the self-adaptive infrastructure needs
to protect itself against. Changes such as new entries added to the authorisation
log, that can be used in the first, second, and third scenarios, are frequent. Other
changes, such as the stolen credentials of the fourth scenario, are likely to be
less frequent. Finally, in the first scenario, the subscription to, or unsubscription
from, the service, is a rare occurrence.
Anticipation The degree of anticipation can also vary. There will certainly be
foreseen changes, and the second scenario provides a good example since any
system connected to the internet can reasonably expect automated attacks to
happen quickly. The system should be able to anticipate some of these attacks.
Foreseeable examples can also be captured by the second scenario: many variants
of attacks will eventually happen, and it is not possible to foresee each and every
variation of them. However, classes of attacks can be recognised, and attacks
that fall into such classes can be detected and dealt with, even if they were
not specifically foreseen. Finally, there may be unforeseen changes, i.e., changes
that the system has not been designed to handle. Those could be dealt with
using automated improvement or modification of existing detection and response
mechanisms (e.g. using genetic algorithms), or sometimes through chance alone.
5.3 Mechanisms
Type The type of mechanism regarding self-adaptive authorisation is paramet-
ric. It is the authorisation policy that is changed by the self-adaptive authori-
sation infrastructure. The authorisation policy is specific to each deployment of
the software: it contains the parameters that determine who can access what,
under which circumstances. Regarding self-adaptive access control, the type of
mechanisms is parametric because self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure can
change how an access control model is implemented, which implies manipulating
the deployment of the different services of a federated environment (Section 2.2).
Autonomy The self-adaptation mechanisms are preferably autonomous in self-
adaptive authorisation, specially, if a potential intrusion is detected. The cre-
dentials should be updated quickly in order to satisfy the confidentiality goal.
The fourth scenario, in particular, require an autonomous mechanism. Since at-
tacks may happen at all times, waiting for the user’s input may take too long.
The first scenario, however, may be implemented using both an autonomous or
an assisted mechanism. If an assisted mechanism is chosen, the users may be
notified that the service’s pattern of requests is unusual, and they can decide
whether to unsubscribe from it or not.
Organisation The adaptation is centralised since there is a single component
controlling all authorisation related services.
Scope The scope of adaptation can vary between local and global, depending
on the change made. A change that affects a user’s ability to use a service is
global when all the users are not able to use that service. The first scenario is
such an example where the detection of suspicious behaviour of the application
service can lead to the service’s credentials to be entirely revoked. However, a
local change could only affect a user’s credentials for a specific service, without
preventing the user from using other services.
Duration The duration of a change may vary from short to long. A subject
could be barred from using the system for a short period of time, up to perma-
nently. The fourth scenario provides a example of a short change duration: once
the external attack is detected, the system can change to a more restricted access
mode for a few minutes to a few hours, until the attack stops. The first scenario
provides an example of a long change duration: once the application service sub-
scription is cancelled and its credentials revoked, the change is permanent, unless
a human intervention subscribes to the service again.
Timeliness The timeliness of changes is best-effort. It is difficult to offer guar-
antees when it comes to modifying the authorisation policy because any change
may require extensive analysis. If many changes happen in a short period of
time, it is unrealistic to hold any requests until the analysis has been done. Fur-
thermore, all of our scenarios require the analysis of patterns of access, which
requires the analysis to involve a number of changes.
Triggering The changes that initiate adaptation are always event-triggered.
The authorisation policy changes are made in response to detected events, which
can happen at any time.
5.4 Effects
Criticality The criticality of a failed self-adaptation may range from harmless
to mission-critical. If the self-adaptation fails, then the system will still be vul-
nerable to the threat it was trying to protect itself against. The criticality of
such a situation depends on the threat itself, and whether unauthorised access
can indeed be obtained. In the third scenario, an external adversary may be able
to penetrate the system and turn it off in which case the self-adaptation failure
would have mission-critical consequences. But if the adversary does not manage
to get into the system in the fourth scenario, then the failure is harmless.
Predictability The consequences of the self-adaptation are deterministic. It is
always possible to find out what are the consequence in adapting a policy.
Overheads The overheads caused by self-adaptation on the system’s perfor-
mance can also vary, from insignificant to system failure. This depends on the
implementation of the system, as well as on the number of attacks detected by
the system.
Resilience A self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure should be resilient. It
is important to make sure that any adaptation to a policy, devised to resist a
particular attack, will not make the system more vulnerable. Evidence should
be provided that the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure makes sound de-
cisions that do not undermine the system resilience properties.
6 Challenges in Engineering Self-adaptive Authorisation
Infrastructures
In this section, we identify some challenges for engineering self-adaptive authori-
sation infrastructures in the context of the MAPE-K loop. Specifically, for each
of the stages of the MAPE-K loop, we discuss what are the challenges specifically
associated with self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures, looking, in particu-
lar, into issues related to insider threats. For example, what type of probes are
needed for the Monitor stage, how to generate dynamic plans in the Plan stage,
and how to perform policy updates in Execution, etc. For each of the challenges,
we identify and describe the challenge, discuss their relevance in the context
of authorisation infrastructures regarding insider threats, and provide an exam-
ple related to the scenarios identified for the case study previously defined (see
Section 3).
6.1 Monitor
The size of what needs to be monitored, and the ability of the monitoring to
adapt its own probes and gauges are the two dimensions that will influence
the complexity of the Monitor stage. Since self-adaptive authorisation infras-
tructures have no control over their environment, it is impossible to foresee all
the environment changes that might affect the system. Some changes can easily
be detected by the probes and gauges of the self-adaptive authorisation infras-
tructure, while some others can remain oblivious if the appropriate probes and
gauges are not provided. In order to avoid the risk of the infrastructure missing
important information, it is necessary to dynamically adapt (1) what needs to
be monitored, and (2) the type of probes and gauges required.
Active Monitoring With passive monitoring, static probes and gauges are
set up at deployment time, to monitor the authorisation infrastructure and its
environment. The probes and gauges are static since they cannot be re-deployed
or removed at run-time, nor can they be re-configured.
While it may be tempting to monitor a wide range of environment resources,
monitoring comes at a cost. It has an impact on performance, and may affect
other requirements, such as the users’ privacy. Within a changing self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure and its environment, the right balance between data
collection and performance or privacy is likely to evolve.
Challenge. The challenge is the provision of active (or pro-active) monitoring
for reducing the amount of traffic related to monitoring considering that some
of the analysis can be performed by the probes and gauges themselves, without
sending the data to the controller for analysis. Moreover, pro-active monitoring
requires the availability of smart probes and gauges, able to adapt to what they
monitor.
Relevance. The key motivation for pro-active monitoring in self-adaptive au-
thorisation infrastructures is to make dynamic access control more resilient to
changes, thereby allowing the infrastructure to better detect and react to insider
threats. The detection of insider threats relies on monitoring a wide range of
resources from the environment of the authorisation service with the purpose
of profiling the status and activity of subjects inside the organisation. As the
monitoring might be outside the ownership of the authorisation service, special
probes need to be synthesised and deployed that might be constrained by privacy
issues, for instance.
Example. In the first scenario, the couple may fall into a routine, leaving and
coming home around the same time every day. An active gauge is monitoring the
users’ location, to turn the heating on and off. However, privacy considerations
require to keep this to a minimum. The gauge identifies a pattern in the users’
location, and may choose to only query the users’ smartphones around the time
where it expects a change in location. Upon detecting an unusual location, the
gauge itself decides to increase its monitoring frequency, in order to feed the
system with more data to detect a potential insider threat.
Run-time Synthesis of Probes and Gauges The synthesis of probes and
gauges at run-time is one way of achieving active monitoring. While the decision
to synthesise probes and gauges may be out of the scope of the Monitor compo-
nent of the MAPE-K loop, their synthesis, configuration, and deployment, are
not.
Challenge. The challenge is the ability to synthesise probes and gauges at
run-time, in response to new or emerging attacks. These probes and gauges,
once deployed, should improve the resilience of the self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructure against unexpected changes.
Relevance. The run-time synthesis and deployment of probes and gauges in
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures can help to cope with the unpre-
dictable nature of an attack. There are no guarantees that what is being mon-
itored is sufficient to identify a whole range of attacks, hence the need to au-
tonomously synthesise and deploy a probe or a gauge that would be able to
examine novel system attributes.
Example. The first scenario in the case study is a good illustration of this:
when the users subscribe to the third party service, a new subject gets access
to the system, thus this new subject must be monitored. A system that is not
very resilient will rely on the user to create, configure and deploy a new set
of probes and gauges to monitor the behaviour of the third party service. On
the other hand, a resilient system should be able to extract a set of probes or
gauges from a repository, before configuring and deploying them automatically.
However, a more resilient system should be able to create a new set of probes
and gauges tailored to the service to be monitored, and configure and deploy
them automatically.
Mutating Gauges Mutating gauges are gauges that are able to change them-
selves, either randomly or guided, in order to identify unknown behavioural
patterns that might be related to an attack. If the monitoring system needs to
have the capability to detect autonomously previously unknown patterns of at-
tack, one way to enable this is to generate new detectors by mutating existing
ones.
Challenge. The challenge is to generate and deploy these mutating gauges
for examining real-time or past data to identify unexpected interactions that
an authorised subject might have with the system being protected. These mu-
tating gauges can be used to provide additional evidence, with some degree of
confidence, that an attack is, or has been, taking place.
Relevance. Since the environment of authorisation infrastructures are dynamic
and unpredictable, one should not expect to know about all possible attacks
before deploying the system. The ability to deploy mutating gauges would enable
the detection of new forms of attack by simply looking for unknown anomalies,
and this would be enabled by the random nature of these gauges, i.e., there is no
implicit expectation of what they should be able to detect. Lets consider the case
in which a gauge monitors the access to a service by authorised users. A possible
change in the environment of this service is the deployment of a new version of
the server providing the service, and this might result in changing the format of
the logs that the gauge is supposed to monitor. Either the original gauge becomes
ineffective, or it needs to be manually re-configured. Alternatively, once a change
is detected in the log format, a mutating gauge may be able to automatically
adapt itself in order to understand the new format. Another possible usage of
mutating gauges would be to enable the perpetual analysis of logs in order to
identify attacks. During run-time, as an offline activity, different gauges could
be dynamically generated by mutation, and these would analyse the logs for
identifying attacks previously unknown.
Example. The first scenario of the case study provides an appropriate context
in which mutating gauges might be useful. A simple gauge could monitor the
third party service when accessing the couple’s location by triggering an alert
only if the location is accessed more than once during a specified time frame.
Mutations of the gauge could record more complex data about the third party
service’s queries. For example, a mutated gauge could keep track of the frequency
of queries over time, and trigger an alert if it suddenly increases, which would
provide the couple with a more precise way of finding out that their privacy is
likely to be under threat.
Incomplete Information Incomplete information refers to the situation in
which the Monitor stage is not able to provide all the information needed by
the other stages of the control loop. This might be due to limited monitoring
capabilities, and because of that, the monitoring stage has to find alternative
ways of obtaining the missing information.
Challenge. Identify and select what to monitor in order to compensate the
missing information, and know where it is safe to make assumptions about the
unknown.
Relevance. Monitoring has a cost, especially when considering insider threats.
The detection of insider threats relies mostly on data from the environment,
and since the environment of an authorisation infrastructure is broad and fluid,
in the sense that it is difficult to establish its clear boundaries, this has an
effect on the data that is collected. Therefore, the system will likely have to deal
with incomplete information, which in the Analyse stage might lead to more
false positives regarding insider threats. One way to compensate for incomplete
information is for the gauges themselves to provide a level of confidence regarding
the information that is forwarded to other stages of the control loop.
Example. The fourth scenario of the case study could benefit from such a
feature in which a confidence level could be incorporated into the monitored
information. The location of a user can be determined via several techniques,
such as the IP address, triangulation from mobile network towers, or GPS signal.
These techniques have varying levels of precision and reliability. Furthermore, a
malicious user may also tamper with the readings in order to fool the system. If a
gauge is able to attach a measure of confidence (obtained, for example, through
several probes using different techniques to capture the user’s location), then
it would help the other stages of the control loop in deciding whether the user
credentials have likely been stolen or not.
Automatic Feature Identification During system operation certain probes
may cease to function, either maliciously or accidentally. In order not to lose
the features being monitored through that probes, the system should be able to
recover some or all of those features by making use of the information provided
by other probes. The assumption is that several features can be associated with a
probe, and that these features can be extracted and combined with other features
from other probes in order to reconstruct totally or partially the information lost
from an unavailable probe.
Challenge. The challenge is for the system to be able to automatically ex-
tract features from its probes, and recombine those features as necessary, thus
exploiting some intrinsic redundancy that may exist amongst the probes. At
run-time, this should be achieved by combining and reconfiguring features that
are associated with the information provided by several probes.
Relevance. This challenge is relevant to self-adaptive authorisation infrastruc-
tures because it helps to increase the system’s resilience against run-time threats
to probes and gauges, whether they are intentional or accidental.
Example. The fourth scenario illustrates an application for automatic feature
identification. In this scenario, if a denial of service attack is detected, the system
can be reconfigured to ensure the availability of its critical services. The system
reconfiguration does not have to be limited to protecting itself from an attack
since the re-combination of the probes’ features may also allow the system to
reduce the monitoring overhead. If probes themselves were affected by the denial
of service attack, then recovering the affected probes’ features using the infor-
mation from other probes would allow the system to maintain the same level of
monitoring.
6.2 Analyse
The Analyse stage is made of two consecutive parts: the problem domain anal-
ysis and the solution domain analysis. The problem domain analyses the data
provided by the Monitor stage in order to identify changes that the system may
have to respond to. The solution domain analysis occurs after a problem has
been identified, and is concerned with generating possible alternative solutions
that are able to handle the problem. The problem domain analysis can be further
divided in two parts: the identification of potential problems, and the assessment
of the identified problem in order to prioritise the mitigation. In some cases, a
problem may be identified as sufficiently serious to be addressed immediately.
At the other end of the spectrum, some problems may be acknowledged, but
ignored, as they are deemed not critical enough to cause adaptation.
In the following, first, we present the challenges related to the problem do-
main: anomaly detection, signature-based detection, case-based detection, diag-
nosis, and normality detection. Then, we present those challenges related to both
problem and solution domains by clearly identifying how these are related to each
of the domains: perpetual evaluation, threat management, and risk analysis.
Anomaly Detection Anomaly detection is related to the ability of the con-
troller to identify any behaviour that deviates from what is perceived to be ac-
ceptable. Since we are essentially dealing with socio-technical systems for which it
is almost impossible to establish, from the outset, all their possible behaviours, it
is extremely challenging to clearly distinguish normal from abnormal behaviour,
i.e., what is acceptable and what it is not. First, there is the uncertainty of the
context of the system that might influence whether a particular behaviour is
deemed to be normal or abnormal. Second, there are the previously unknown or
unexpected behaviours that need to be classified according to profiles of similar
class of behaviours.
Since there is no single technique that should be able to accurately detect a
wide range of anomalies, one way of reducing the number of misclassifications
is to use diverse techniques whose outcome should be fused for providing confi-
dence in the classification. In the following, after introducing anomaly detection
challenge, we present, as an example, two specific complementarity anomaly de-
tection techniques that can be used for improving both the responsiveness and
coverage when detecting anomalies.
Challenge. The key challenge in anomaly detection is to be accurate when de-
tecting anomalies under uncertainty in order to reduce misclassifications, specif-
ically in the context of insider threats. Since misclassifications cannot be elimi-
nated, it is important to associate with those classifications levels of uncertainty.
Relevance. The ability of detecting anomalies should precede the system ca-
pability of handling insider threats. Since it is difficult to accurately identify
an attack, uncertainty levels should be considered so the system can evaluate a
particular detection against its context. The objective is to reduce the number
of false positives and false negatives that might have detrimental consequences
upon self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures.
Example. The first scenario, regarding reading and writing requests, motivates
quite well the need for having accurate detection of a misuse. If a particular
abuse is not detected in time, the privacy of the couple might be compromised.
All the other scenarios also quite motivate the need for having an effective and
efficiency means for detecting anomalies because the failure of not detecting an
abuse might compromise the whole system.
Signature-based Detection Signature-based detection is a special case of
anomaly detection (see Section 6.2), where domain analysis is performed by
matching the data provided by the Monitor stage against signatures of known
problems. A signature is a pattern that should be matched against the data
provided by the Monitor stage, such as, an IP address, a particular regular ex-
pression in a log file, a URL, a version of some software, etc. Signature-based
detection may require the matching of several individual signatures to identify
a threat. They are relatively easy to automate. Since signatures refer to precise
pieces of information, it is possible to completely automate their recognition,
and therefore the identification of threats. With a sufficiently expressive lan-
guage to write the signatures and their interactions, complex analysis can be
performed to discover advanced threats. Administrators should also be allowed
to define signatures, as well as, combinations of signatures, and associate them
with threats.
Challenge. Since the signature-based detection is a static technique, the chal-
lenge is to be able to synthesise new signature-based detectors during run-time.
Relevance. Signature-based detection is best suited to detect threats that are
known and well understood in advance. However, in the context of self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure the efficacy of static signature-based detectors is
quite restrictive considering that both the attacks and the infrastructure can
change. Thus the need for the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure to be
able to generate dynamically new signature-based detectors that are able to
detect unknown threats efficiently at run-time.
Example. The second scenario provides an example for a simple signature-based
detection algorithm. If the energy retailer is able to provide a wide range of ser-
vices from different IP addresses, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure
needs to identify those legitimate services that might abuse their privileges. For
example, the authorisation infrastructure needs detects that a particular service
from the energy retailer, originating from a particular IP address, reads the cou-
ple’s energy use too often, which may result in a potential threat to the couple’s
privacy. The detection of the energy retailer’s behaviour can be implemented us-
ing signature-based detection, where the signature of the threat is a number of
connections from the energy retailer’s IP address that exceeds a pre-determined
threshold in a pre-determined time frame.
Case-based Detection Case-based detection is another special case of
anomaly detection, where the focus is on observing subjects’ behaviours, which
are harder to model, and hence, harder to automate. Where signature-based de-
tection attempts to identify well-defined actions performed by malicious subjects,
case-based detection observes the malicious behaviour of subject, and allows for
decisions to be made based on the subject’s behaviour model. Moreover, instead
of absolute thresholds for identifying anomaly detection, relative thresholds com-
paring users behaviours can be used.
Challenge. The challenge in case-based detection involves recognising a be-
haviour that may not be explicitly forbidden, but still suspicious.
Relevance. It may be the case that a subject will try to circumvent signature-
based detection since signature-based detection works by using thresholds and
precise patterns of attacks. This is where case-based detection becomes useful.
The attacker may be slowed down because of their efforts to avoid detection, but
that does not mean that the threat does not need to be addressed. Case-based
detection is a good way to complement signature-based detection because of its
ability to detect and act upon those types of threats, although it is more difficult
to be fully automated.
Example. Since case-based detection can complement signature-based detec-
tion, we use the same example to illustrate both approaches. With signature-
based detection, the intrusive energy retailer was detected when they read the
couple’s energy consumption more than a pre-defined number of times during
a given time frame. One way for the energy retailer to avoid detection by the
signature-based detection system is to stay right under the threshold. Finding
out what the threshold may have involved getting caught once. The case-based
detection system may be looking at the history of the read operations by the
energy retailer. This analysis may identify that the frequency went up until they
got caught by the signature-based detection system, before staying just under
the threshold. This may be constructed as suspicious behaviour, especially if the
retailer had previously performed much less read operations per time period.
Similarly, the detection of abuse could be related to a dynamic threshold in-
stead of a static one. By profiling the number of times the energy retailer reads
the energy consumption within particular time intervals, these can be compared
for detecting an abuse. An administrator may be notified and shown a model
of the retailer’s behaviour to decide whether is their can be characterised as
intrusive
Diagnosis When an attack is detected, the system may try to identify the
source of the attack, how it was performed, what damage it caused or is causing,
and which vulnerability was used to carry it out. Diagnosing an attack allows
the system to better understand it, and therefore to make better decisions to
defend against it.
Challenge. The challenge of diagnosing self-adaptive authorisation infrastruc-
tures is the ever changing type of attack, and the new vulnerabilities that might
be introduced during adaptation.
Relevance. Identifying the source of the attack and the vulnerability exploited
is key to stopping it to propagate, as well as making sure that it does not happen
again. A self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure that can understand where
attacks come from and how they are carried out will be more resilient than a
system that can only identify them without understanding what caused them to
be successful.
Example. The third scenario (Section 3.3) can be handled much better by a
self-adaptive system capable of performing diagnosis on the attack. A system
that does not attempt to understand the attack may restrict its actions to mod-
ifying the user’s credentials. However, if the attacker used a vulnerability in
the system to gain the user’s credentials, they can run the attack again once
the credentials have been re-configured. A system that would perform advanced
diagnosis, however, may be able to identify how the attacker got hold of the
credentials, and may be able to solve the root issue, or give the administrator
useful data for them to do so manually.
Resuming Normality When an attack is over and a threat does not anymore
pose danger, or when a particular risk that had previously identified has been
mitigated, the system should be able to undo the restrictive measures that were
taken for protecting the system against the attack, or the likelihood of an at-
tack. This would be more relevant if the restrictive measures taken affected the
system’s normal operation. This should be done without exposing the system to
other attacks.
Challenge. After taking measures to protect the system against attacks, the
challenge is when to undo some of the restrictive measures, and what measures
should be put in place in order maintain a balance between usability and security.
Relevance. Measures taken to prevent or mitigate attacks, in the context of self-
adaptive authorisation infrastructures, often take the form of reduced capabilities
for users, or more stringent authorisation procedures. If the system were not able
to scale back some of the measures taken after the event that triggered them has
occurred, then the system would tend towards locking all the users out of the
system. It is therefore crucial that the system is able to always strike the correct
balance between usability and security.
Example. The second scenario (Section 3.3), where the intrusive energy retailer
is prevented from reading energy consumption data if they have done it too
often, requires for the counter-measure to be eventually lifted. This can be done
after the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures has assessed that the energy
provider’s behaviour does not pose a threat anymore. Failure to do so would
prevent the provider from reading data that is essential to correctly billing the
users.
Perpetual Evaluation When the controller is not adapting the target system,
it can run background tasks to enhance the resilience of the self-adaptive autho-
risation infrastructure. Perpetual evaluation is one such task, which stands for
the continuous analysis of either the problem or solution domains.
Challenge. The challenge associated with the perpetual evaluation of the prob-
lem domain is the identification of vulnerabilities and attacks that might affect
the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure. On the other hand, the challenge
associated with the perpetual evaluation of the solution domain is the provi-
sion of assurances regarding the quality of services provided by the self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure.
Relevance. Perpetual evaluation can be used alongside traditional evaluation in
order to improve the coverage in detecting insider attacks, localise vulnerabilities,
and enhancing the provision of assurances. This can be done either proactively
or reactively.
If insider attacks can be predicted to occur depending on some observable
pattern of behaviour, adaptation can be proactive, and the same applies to eval-
uation. Since the proactive perpetual evaluation does not block any immediate
adaptation, it can only inform future adaptations. While traditional evaluation
can make fast, but imperfect, decisions, the reactive perpetual evaluation com-
pliments traditional evaluation by confirming that the adaptation satisfies the
system goal, or point to issues that may require a rollback, or further adapta-
tion. This is possible because the reactive perpetual evaluation can afford to take
longer to complete, and consider more data or more stringent constraints. This
is especially useful in scenarios where timeliness of adaptation is important, such
as the response to insider threats.
Example. The third scenario (Section 3.3) illustrates the advantages of perpet-
ual evaluation. Detecting suspicious deletions should be done very quickly, as
one would like to minimise the data loss. Ideally, suspicious behaviours should
be detected before any data loss happens. However, it may not be easy to tell
the difference between legitimate and illegitimate deletion.
Proactive perpetual evaluation could monitor the system’s access logs, and
compare each user’s actions to their behaviour profile, and the behaviour profile
of similar users. If a user starts acting suspiciously, adaptation could be triggered
before the users starts deleting sensitive data.
Using reactive perpetual evaluation could allow the system to suspend a
user’s permissions when suspicious activity is detected, like the deletion of a
large number of files. This can be achieved quickly using traditional evaluation
techniques. The reactive perpetual evaluation could then consider more elements,
such as a longer history of the user’s access data, or access data for similar
users, to determine with more confidence whether the file deletions were likely
to be legitimate or not. If they were legitimate, a plan to reactivate the user
account can be made. If they were not, it confirms that the decision taken by
the traditional evaluation was the right one.
Threat Management There may be several simultaneous attacks detected
or vulnerabilities identified, and responses to these in the form of adaptations
should be prioritised. Furthermore, responses may increase the attack surface,
or weaken other security measures.
Challenge. In the problem domain, the ability to prioritise attacks and vulnera-
bilities is a challenge associated with threat management, which should take into
account the threats’ potential impact on the system’s operations, and attempt
to take preventive measures, to ensure that future threats can be addressed.
In the solution domain, the challenge associated with threat management is
the ability to rank alternative responses, and to ensure that a response does not
increase the system’s attack surface, or weakens its security measures.
Relevance. Any perceived attack or vulnerability should not be considered
in isolation from its current or historical contexts, otherwise problem domain
analysis might be incomplete, thus producing outcomes that might undermine
the mitigation of threats. Likewise, from the solution domain perspective, any
measure to handle the perceived attack or vulnerability should take into account
other measures either being processed or already processed. The goal is to reduce
the amount of resources needed for handling the attack or the vulnerability,
and minimise the risk of introducing new vulnerabilities. Moreover, considering
that known vulnerabilities might exist in the authorisation infrastructure, these
should be taken into account when analysing measures for mitigating a perceived
attack.
Example. The attack in the first scenario (Section 3.3) combined with the
attack of the second scenario (Section 3.3). In this situation, the self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure should decide which one of the attacks is or higher
risk, respectively, the compromise of integrity in the services provided by the
third party, or the privacy violation by energy retailer.
Risk Analysis When perceived to be under attack, an authorisation infrastruc-
ture can be used risk levels to rank alternative responses and select the most
appropriate one. Factors that can influence the risk level include the coverage of
the evaluation, the severity of the attack and/or the vulnerability, but also the
impact of countermeasures on the system’s operations.
Challenge. The challenge of risk analysis in the problem domain is to determine
the seriousness of an attack, which should establish the appropriate response
level. Regarding the solution domain, risk analysis should guide the selection of
the most appropriate response when several options are available.
Relevance. In the problem domain, depending on the perceived risk, attacks
and vulnerabilities may need to be dealt with immediately, while others may
allow for a delayed response, or no response at all, at little to no cost on the
system’s security. Whether a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure shall re-
act to an attack should depend on the risk associated with the attack and/or
vulnerability: the probability of an attack to be successful, and the impact the
attack might have on the system in case is not mitigated.
Regarding the solution domain, adaptation may be expensive, whether in
terms of time, computation resources, or inconvenience to legitimate users
through degradation of the service. Therefore, a sophisticated authorisation in-
frastructure could use risk analysis to prioritise the order in which attacks should
be addressed, and when and how to deal with them.
Example. A combination of the second and third scenarios (Sections 3.3 and
3.3, respectively) illustrate the need for risk analysis. In the second scenario, the
system detects that the energy retailer reads data from the meter more often
than agreed. This issue needs to be addressed, but might not be the most critical.
The third scenario, however, deals with the detection of data being deleted by
a malicious user. This should be stopped as soon as possible since more data
will be lost until the issue is addressed. If issues arising from both scenarios are
detected around the same time, and if the system is only able to deal with one
issue after the other, then the data deletion attack should be addressed before
the energy provider attack.
6.3 Plan
The Plan stage is made of two consecutive parts: decision making and plan syn-
thesis. The purpose of decision making is to select the most appropriate solution
amongst the alternatives provided by the solution domain analysis. Below, we
have identified three challenges associated with decision making: decision making
in a federated authorisation infrastructure, randomising decisions, and denial of
service. The goal of plan synthesis is to generate a plan that implements the se-
lected solution. We identified six challenges related to the plan synthesis: robust
plans, controller capabilities, and infrastructure boundary.
Decision Making in a Federated Authorisation Infrastructure There are
several benefits associated with federated authorisation infrastructures, being
one of them the ability of authenticating users using third parties. However,
these pose additional challenges to the planning phase, compare with a simpler,
centralised infrastructure over which a single entity or user has complete control.
The selection of the best solution amongst alternatives, identified during the
analysis problem domain, needs to consider the self-interests of the different
parties of the federation. The component systems of a federated authorisation
infrastructure may have conflicting interests and goals, and varying constraints
(e.g., an identity provider service may conflict with a service provider). Yet it
is important to be able to select the best solution amongst those identified in
the analysis solution domain, while satisfying the goals and constraints of all the
components in the federated authorisation infrastructure.
Challenge. Decision making in a federated authorisation infrastructure should
take into account the potentially conflicting goals of all the parties in the in-
frastructure, and negotiate a solution that satisfies them all. This may require
a solution that is not optimal, but “good enough”, and acceptable to all parties
involved.
Relevance. In a self-adaptive federated authorisation infrastructure, it is ex-
pected for third parties to undergo some kind of change, for example, involving
their goals or their deployment. This should have an impact on how the different
parties collaborate in order to maximise each party self-interest. However, adap-
tation decisions that involve federated authorisation infrastructures may require
negotiation between several stakeholders. If all the component systems’ goals
cannot be satisfied, then a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure may have
to consider stopping its collaboration with some or all of the component systems
with whom a compromise could not be reached.
Example. In the fourth scenario, user credentials are stolen by a malicious
subject. If the resources under attack are protected by a federated authorisation
infrastructure where identity management is handled by third parties, the self-
adaptive system may have to negotiate with the identity providers in order for
them to take action against the malicious subject. However, should the third
party fail to meet the security expectations of the self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructure, the infrastructure may decide to revoke its trust in the third
party, and forbid all authentication tokens coming from it.
Randomising Decisions If the decision maker, for particular operational con-
text, always selects the same strategy, then a new vulnerability is being intro-
duced. If an attacker, while interacting with the system or observing its be-
haviour, is able to establish deterministically the response of the self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure, the attacker may be able to take advantage of this
adaptation, and cause harm to the system.
Challenge. The selection of an adaptation solution among several more-or-less
equally acceptable options should be randomised, in order to prevent an attacker
from learning about the system’s response to a particular output, thus reducing
the attack surface.
Relevance. Self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures could be targeted by
attackers wishing to exploit a new vulnerability introduced by the controller. The
nature of the adaptation measures that can be taken poses at least two threats.
First, the attackers could trick the self-adaptive system into banning users, or
groups of users, even if only for a limited amount of time, causing disruptions in
the users’ ability to use the service. Second, the attackers could trigger a denial
of service attack by forcing very frequent changes in the authorisation policies,
which would overwhelm the system.
Example. In the first scenario, a compromised service gets access to the sys-
tem. The compromised service could attempt to learn how the authorisation
infrastructure adapts by purposefully attempting to trigger self-adaptation, and
finding out how the system reacts to certain events through observation. If the
response to specific threats is not always the same, it will be much more difficult
for the compromised service to learn how the system works, and how it could be
disrupted.
Denial of Service Denial-of-service (DoS) aims to make resource unavailable to
their legitimate users, for example, by flooding a server with bogus requests that
waste computing resources. An attacker could use the self-adaptation mechanism
for this purpose, preventing legitimate users from using the service.
Challenge. As a challenge, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure should
be able to analyse the triggers for self-adaptation, identify their source and fre-
quency, and react accordingly in order to avoid the system to become unusable.
Relevance. Authorisation infrastructures for which the execution of self-
adaptation requires reloading configuration files, restarting services, or inter-
rupting or cancelling long-lived operations, are particularly vulnerable to DoS
attacks. If the attacker finds a way to trigger self-adaptation often enough,
the system may become unusable for legitimate users. In this case, the self-
adaptation mechanism itself is the attack vector used by the attacker to perpe-
trate his attack. If the system detects a possible DoS attack, it may then switch
to a less obtrusive means of self-adaptation if available, or disable self-adaptation
for some time. Another option would be to cap the number of self-adaptation
operations that disturb the service for a specified time period.
Example. The compromised service in the first example could use its credentials
to trigger a DoS attack. It could find out which operations will likely trigger
a self-adaptation that will render the service unavailable for some time, and
then find a way to trigger that self-adaptation often enough that the system
will be unusable by legitimate users. An attack that would trigger a restart of
the authentication server and the revocation of user sessions would be a good
example. Users would have to constantly re-authenticate and would not be able
to use the system properly. If, however, the system were to be able to detect
such an attack, it could change its adaptation strategy so that legitimate users
are not affected, for example, by banning the compromised service until it is
manually re-activated by an administrator.
Robust Plans Some of the activities in a plan may be more likely to fail than
others. This could be related to complex interactions between components of a
federated authorisation infrastructure. This can be caused by software or hard-
ware failures, or simply because assumptions made during the conceptualisation
of the plan cease to be true during its execution.
Challenge. In a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure, the challenge is to
obtain a robust plan that should be able to handle failures in one or several of its
activities, while minimising service interruptions. The plan should incorporate
redundancy in its activities, or the ability to rollback to a previous working
secure state, in case an activity fails.
Relevance. Authorisation infrastructures involve various component systems,
as well as a number of policies whose interactions determine who gets access
to what. If a plan is not robust enough, the infrastructure could be left in an
intermediate insecure and unstable state, i.e., some authorisation decisions could
allow unauthorised subjects access to sensitive data. If a plan is rolled back, then
the infrastructure is again vulnerable to the insider threat that had triggered the
(aborted) adaptation. None of these scenarios are acceptable, and therefore, the
plan should be as robust as possible in order to deal with any unexpected issue
arising during its execution. This can be achieved by enabling the controller
to generate abstract plans (i.e., a plan that does not depend on any particular
implementation, it can support several alternative implementations) that can
be instantiated into concrete plans during their execution. In case a particular
instantiation of an activity fails during its execution, the abstract plan should
incorporate enough redundancy in order to activate an alternative instantiation.
Example. The first scenario illustrates the need for a robust plan. Once the
compromised service has been detected, the self-adaptive authorisation infras-
tructure should synthesise a plan that would remove the service’s credentials
from the authorisation policy, and would reload the new policy into the authori-
sation infrastructure. If, for some reason, the policy cannot be properly reloaded
into the infrastructure, then the system is left into an intermediate state in which
the compromised service still has access to the system. A plan that incorporates
redundancies could, for example, force the whole authorisation infrastructure to
be restarted using a restricted but trusted policy, if a new valid policy cannot
be reloaded.
Controller Capabilities What a controller is able to achieve in a self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure is restricted by its capabilities. These capabilities are
related to what the controller is able to observe and control, and its computa-
tional and algorithm resources. Limitations on the controller’s capabilities might
have an impact on the plans that a controller is able to synthesise, and these
limitations should be incorporated into plans.
Challenge. In a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure, because of its na-
ture, it is difficult to forecast changes that might affect the system and its envi-
ronment, the challenge is for the controller to be able to identify its own limita-
tions. In case an operational boundary is reached, the controller should be able
to act, either by shutting itself down or invoke another alternative controller, for
example.
Relevance. While synthesising a plan, there is a risk that some implementations
are not able to support activities of the plan. For example, the controller of a
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is able to synthesise plans that only
contain activities that rely on XACML implementation of Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP), while the actual components of the infrastructure rely on other
implementations rather than XACML.
Example. The first scenario illustrates the need for the controllers of self-
adaptive authorisation infrastructures to be aware of their limitations. Once
the compromised service has been detected, the self-adaptive authorisation in-
frastructure should synthesise a plan that would remove the service’s credentials
from the authorisation policy, and would reload the new policy into the authori-
sation infrastructure. If PERMIS is used as an authorisation server, for example,
policy cannot be reloaded without restarting the entire server. A plan that re-
quires reloading a policy would fail, unless it allows for the server to be restarted
as an alternative.
Infrastructure Boundary In a federated authorisation infrastructure, some
components can be managed by third parties, and this should be captured by
control boundaries that can be dynamic according to the role of the components
of the infrastructure. These components may have different or even conflicting
goals, hence negotiations between components are needed in order maximise their
self-interest. In a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure, the controller may
only have partial control, or no control at all, over some of the components of
the federated authorisation infrastructure. Considering that a controller needs
to act on some components of the infrastructure that are owned by a third
party, it is necessary that each party can trust each other in order to enable the
negotiations.
Challenge. In a federated authorisation infrastructure in which self-adaptation
underpins the authorisation services, the challenge is the ability of establishing
boundaries of awareness and influence, and the ability of handling the dynamic
nature of these boundaries.
Relevance. Control boundaries are particularly relevant in federated authori-
sation infrastructures, where the controller does not have direct control over the
third party components. The controller may be able to request components of
a federated authorisation framework to enact some changes, but these changes
may only be accepted if they do not conflict with the goals of those components.
In a federated authorisation infrastructure, boundaries can be related to what
can be monitored and control, and to levels of trust, for example.
Example. The third scenario illustrates the issue of control boundary. If the
subject deleting data at an alarming rate has authenticated using a third party
service outside of the controller’s control boundary, the controller may devise
a plan that first asks the third party service to ban the user for some time.
However, the controller cannot force the third party service to enact this ban.
Thus, the controller may also generate an alternative, which would ban the third
party identity service entirely for some time.
6.4 Execute
The Execute stage is responsible for executing the adaptation plan generated
during the Plan stage. However, the execution of the plan may not always be
straightforward since it involves several distinct needs, including the following
ones:
– meet the objectives of the adaptation plan (including, the synthesis of ef-
fectors, deployment of probes/gauges), and provide assurances that effectors
have indeed carried out their actions (i.e., feedback of success);
– effectors must trust the controller of the self-adaptive authorisation infras-
tructure, in terms of authentication, authorisation, and non-repudiation;
– Execute stage is able to coordinate the effectors in issues, like, concurrency,
rollbacks and commits, recovery from failed plans, and heterogeneity of ef-
fectors;
– adaptation plans incorporate redundancies for making its execution more
resilient, and for supporting the provision of trust that resilience can be
achieved;
– execution of the adaptation plan is secure in order to avoid exploitation of
vulnerabilities;
– adaptation plans incorporate abstract commands since it should be down to
the effector to decide how to implement a given action of the plan;
– synthesise and/or deploy probes, gauges and effectors, or even update its
own adaptation strategy in order to respond to new threats being detected;
– ability to reloading adapted authorisation policies, or restarting authorisa-
tion services or other related services;
– ability to communicating with third-party identity providers, amongst other
services, for example.
Underpinning all these needs, there is the fundamental need to provide as-
surances that the execution of the plan is according to its specifications. The
execution of a plan may involve checking post-conditions, and it should provide
feedback of its progress. In the following, some of the above needs will be detailed
in term of challenges.
Deployment and Withdrawl of Probes, Gauges and Effectors Although
the deployment and withdrawal of probes, gauges and effectors might be outside
the context of Execute stage of a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure, these
are an integral part of the adaptation plan and its execution. Probes, gauges and
effectors could either be taken from a pool, which is populated at development-
time, or synthesised at run-time for allowing the system to react to unforeseen
changes (see Section 6.4). This dynamic deployment and withdrawal is different
from the active monitoring challenge discussed in Section 6.1. In active moni-
toring, deployed gauges and probes have their own self-adaptive mechanism. In
contrast, we discuss in this section the deploying and withdrawing of probes,
gauges and effectors as the result of the evolution of self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructures. As such, the deployment of new probes, gauges and effectors
instead of being under the direct responsibility of a self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructure, we could have a higher level entity responsible for controlling the
evolution of the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure.
Challenge. One of the challenges in self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures
is the ability to deploy and withdraw probes, gauges and effectors because of the
wide range, and volatile nature, of threats that the system has to protect itself
against.
Relevance. In a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure changes affecting
the infrastructure or its environment should be handled by the controller, and
the ensuing adaptations may have an impact on how the controller observes
and effects the infrastructure and/or its environment. Consequently, this may
affect the probes, gauges and effectors that are deployed. The complexity of
the deployment can range from entirely pre-defined probes, gauges and effectors
that simply need to be activated, to the synthesis of new ones (see Section 6.4).
An intermediate solution would be the ability to configure pre-defined probes,
gauges and effectors for a particular use.
Example. The first scenario provides an example of probe deployment and
withdrawal. When the couple subscribes to the energy saving service, it is nec-
essary to monitor the service’s behaviour through the deployment of probes and
gauges. If the probes and gauges are simply pre-defined, they will already have
been written for the particular service chosen by the couple. A more challeng-
ing option is for the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure to configure the
probes and gauges, depending on what the service has access to, what the system
wants to monitor, and the implementation details of the chosen service.
Automated Synthesis of Probes, Gauges, and Effectors It is not possi-
ble for the developers, at development-time, to foresee all the possible threats
that the system could face. Too many of those depend on the environment in
which the system operates, and this environment can change at any time. The
synthesis of new probes, gauges and effectors at run-time allows the system to
react to changes in the system or its environment that would otherwise affect
the resilience of the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure.
Challenge. The challenge of a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure to re-
act to changes that are not foreseen at development-time is to synthesise probes,
gauges and effectors at run-time.
Relevance. Responding to threats that had not been foreseen during
development-time is essential for self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures. Oc-
casionally, handling some of these threats may require probes, gauges and ef-
fectors that are not yet available. In particular, the self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructure may require new probes or gauges for monitoring new features
of the system or its environment. The ability to synthesise probes, gauges and
effectors during run-time will broaden the range of unforeseen threats that the
system can protect itself against.
Example. To demonstrate the automated synthesis of effectors, we postulate
the deployment of a new identity provider. Such a deployment could be part
of the response to the compromised service described in the first scenario. The
identity provider that was used to carry out the initial attack might have been
banned, and a new one may need to be deployed. The deployment of a new
identity provider requires the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure to deploy
new effectors to communicate with the new identity provider, e.g., to ask it to
ban a particular user for a given amount of time. It may also be necessary to
synthesise new probes if the infrastructure needs to monitor the new identity
provider.
Trust Trust is necessary between the parties in a federated authorisation in-
frastructure. The controller should trust that the other parties will carry out the
plan as expected, and the other parties must trust that the controller acts in
their advantage.
Challenge. A a key challenge in a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is
to maintain trust between the parties by ensuring all parties behave as agreed.
This is not restricted to techniques that ensure trust is maintained, but also
associated with strategies that are used when reacting to a breach of trust.
Relevance. If a malicious user has been detected and reported to the identity
service, but the identity service fails to take action to suspend the malicious
user, then the trust between the authorisation infrastructure and the identity
service should be reevaluated. As authentication is a critical component in access
control. It is crucial for the authorisation infrastructure to be able to react to
such breaches of trust, as they may harm the protected system.
Example. The second scenario provides a good example regarding trust. In
this scenario, the authorisation infrastructure detects that the energy company
is acting against the users’ interest by attempting to collect too much data, and
too often. The self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is able to detect this as
a breach of trust. The controller reacts by requesting to the identity services to
revoke the credentials of the energy company, which should affect its ability to
gather any further data.
Update or Redeployment of Policies, and Sessions Self-adaptive autho-
risation infrastructures can adapt authorisation policies in various ways. The
adaptation could either take the form of an update of the current policy, where
the controller sends the modifications to the policy decision point (PDP). Alter-
natively, the controller may create a whole new policy, and instruct the PDP to
deploy it instead of the previous one.
When adapting authorisation policies, the infrastructure should also consider
the sessions that are currently open by a particular user, and which may carry
permissions that the user should not be assigned anymore sessions. All sessions
could be revoked every time adaptation occurs. Alternatively, sessions could be
amended in order to reflect the changes made in the authorisation policy.
Challenge. During the execution of the plan, the challenge is to reduce the
system vulnerability while policies are updated or redeployed.
Relevance. The adaptation of an authorisation policy is an important part of
a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure’s reaction to an internal threat. It
is important that the adaptation is completed in a timely manner, in order to
minimise the amount of time during which an attacker can cause damage to the
system. The choice between updating the existing policy or deploying a new one
should take into account the amount of time required for the new policy to be
effective. Updating an existing policy requires the controller to communicate to
the PDP only the changes to be made to the current policy. It is then the PDP’s
responsibility to enact those changes. Deploying a new policy, however, requires
the controller to prepare a complete, updated policy, and to communicate in to
the PDP, which only needs to deploy it to replace the previous one.
Existing sessions should also be taken care of in order to adapt the permis-
sions given to the users that are logged on to the system while the adaptation
takes place. Terminating all sessions is a simple solution, but it will require each
use to authenticate again. In some circumstances this may not be ideal, espe-
cially if adaptation occurs often. The alternative is to modify user sessions at
run-time, which may be more difficult to implement.
A similar challenge could be associated with the deployment of new probes
and effectors, in particular those that are third party. The heterogeneity and the
inflexibility of such devices may introduce vulnerabilities during adaptation.
Example. The third scenario illustrates the importance of handling existing
sessions when updating or redeploying the authorisation policy. In this scenario,
data is being deleted by an attacker using stolen, legitimate credentials. Once
the attack has been detected by the Analyse stage, and the policy adapted
by the Execute stage, the session used by the attacker must be taken care of.
Depending on the infrastructure’s implementation, two alternatives are available.
First, the session can be terminated entirely, forcing the attacker to attempt to
authenticate again using the stolen credentials. Second, the privileges afforded
to the session may be reduced, in such a way that the attacker would be unable
to continue deleting data, but without terminating the session.
Redundancy Introducing redundancy in the Execute stage is one way to in-
crease the resilience of the system. In case an effector fails to properly execute
a portion of the plan, the plan should incorporate redundancies, using other ef-
fectors, alternative solutions, or workarounds, that would allow to tolerate the
failed execution.
Whilst the incorporation of redundancies in case of failure may be, in part,
the responsibility of Plan stage, it is the responsibility of the Execute stage to
monitor the execution of that plan, and to trigger the redundancy measures
when necessary.
Challenge. The challenge is to include sufficient redundancies in the execution
of the plan in order to make adaptation more resilient against potential threats,
being these either internal attacks or faults.
Relevance. The consequences of a failure during the execution of a plan while
adapting an authorisation policy can be disastrous. At best, the old policy will
still be in place, and the system will not be protected against the newly identified
threat. At worst, the authorisation infrastructure could fail, either by locking all
users out, or by letting everyone access everything. Implementing redundant
mechanisms to update policies will increase the service’s resilience.
Example. All the scenarios in the case study could provide an example of the
importance of reacting to failures during Execute stage. In the second scenario,
the inability of the infrastructure to reduce the energy company’s rate of data
collection will directly harm the users’ privacy. The plan can include contingency
provisions that handle this particular issue, and an alternative strategy, which
is an integral part of the plan being executed, can then be deployed, such as,
giving the energy company empty readings when they try to collect data too
often.
6.5 Models
There are several types of models relevant to authorisation infrastructures, as
well as, many ways of using them for self-adaptation. In this section, we first
categorise models for authorisation infrastructures into four types: authorisation
polices, access control, threat, and adaptation. We then focus on the challenges
that stem from the use of these models, which include: portability, facilitating
negotiation, history of models, uncertainty and conflicts in models, and model
drift.
The examples in this section differ from those in the previous section. Instead
of using the scenarios from our case study to highlight challenges, we will instead
discuss the case study in general. This is because models are the same in the
application, and do not depend on specific scenarios.
Modelling authorisation policies Authorisation policies are a central com-
ponent of authorisation infrastructures, where rules or assignments are defined,
and whose evaluation determines whether requests for access to protected assets
are granted or denied. Policies can be very large, and they can be distributed
across several documents, using various technologies, or, in the case of federated
authorisation infrastructures, under the control of different entities.
Challenge. Models of authorisation policies should be understandable yet pre-
cise for facilitating their manipulation by both the controller and system admin-
istrators.
Relevance. For supporting the automated manipulation of models, these need
to be precise, and at the same time, in order to allow the validation of the models
against their respective policies, these models need to be accessible to users. The
reason being that, since authorisation policies determine the rendering of access
control decisions, the authorisation policies models should be consistent with
the actual authorisation policies in order to avoid discrepancies between the
authorisation infrastructure and its controller. So whatever changes are made
on the authorisation policies, either by users or automated tools, these need to
be accurately reflected on their corresponding models.
Example. In our case study, the Customer Energy Management System (EMS)
maintains the authorisation policies. In order to present a coherent view of the
policies to the user, the EMS must be able to collect all the policies, which may
be expressed in different languages or using different access control models, and
collate them in a way that is easy for users to make sense of them. Furthermore,
since third parties or service providers, such as the energy provider, may have
some control over parts of the authorisation policies, their correspondent models
should be able to capture any changes made on the policies. On the top of this,
there is the controller, which should be able to manipulate the different control
models.
Modelling access control Authorisation infrastructures often involve several
key components that are connected for rendering access control decisions. For
example, the XACML standard recommends that an authorisation infrastruc-
ture should be separated into the following distinct components [52]: Policy
Decision Points (PDP), Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), Policy Information
Points (PIP), and Policy Administration Points (PAP). Architectural models
at the controller should be able to capture the components of an authorisation
infrastructure, and how these components are connected.
Challenge. Architectural models should be dynamic because the infrastructure
is expected to change, and these should be capture by the models. Such dynamic
architectural models should be able to capture issues, such as, the unavailability
of components. In the context of federated authorisation infrastructures, ar-
chitectural models should also be able to support access control and provide
assurances of this ability.
Relevance. In self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures, dynamic architec-
tural models are essential for enabling the controller to handle changes affecting
the infrastructure. Architectural models enable to analyse the consequence of
threats to the infrastructure, and investigate potential architectural solutions for
mitigating those threats. For example, if an identity service fails to revoke cre-
dentials from subjects that are perceived as persistent attackers, the self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure may chose to disconnect that identity service from
its infrastructure. However, before implementing that solution, the authorisation
infrastructure may evaluate the impact of such a measure towards its users.
Example. In our case study, the EMS is at the centre of the federated authori-
sation infrastructure, and its architecture should include the third party service
provider and the energy provider, both sharing the EMS control over the smart
meter. When adaptation occurs, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure
must be aware of all those components in order to effect changes across the
infrastructure.
Modelling threats The purpose of self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures
is to defend the system against threats. Since threats can change throughout the
life time of an infrastructure, threat models should be dynamic, i.e., models that
are able to change according to the threats to the infrastructure.
Challenge. For reasoning about threats in self-adaptive infrastructures, a mod-
elling language for expressing dynamic threat models is needed. In addition to
representing threats, threat models should capture the likelihood of their oc-
currence, the potential harm they can cause to the infrastructure’s assets, and
which countermeasures can be taken to address them. If the self-adaptive infras-
tructure is capable of discovering previously unknown threats, then the threat
model should be adaptable at run-time.
Relevance. Threats, whether internal or external, are what self-adaptive au-
thorisation infrastructures try to defend the system against. This can only be
done if these infrastructures have a suitable model of threats, and if these models
cannot be adapted according to ever changing threats a vulnerability will ensue.
Example. A threat model for our case study could represent, for example, abuse
regarding smart meter’s queries. A possible threat and its response is discussed
in the second scenario. A model of the threat is necessary for the infrastructure
to realise that an attack is taking place. The model could simply be a counter
representing the number of queries from the energy retailer over a set period
of time, with a threshold above which the attack is deemed to happen. A more
complex model could maintain a historical distribution of the queries’ frequency,
together with a variation limit that, once reached, would represent an attack
taking place.
Modelling adaptation The various models supporting self-adaptive authorisa-
tion infrastructures should take into account the run-time adaptation capabilities
of the infrastructure. In particular, adaption models should represent what parts
of the authorisation infrastructure can be adapted, how the adaptation can be
executed and in which order, and when or under which conditions adaptation
can happen.
Challenge. There is the need to specify adaptation models that would be able
to coordinate adaptations taking at different levels of an authorisation infras-
tructure, and to identify what kind of assurances those models can provide.
Relevance. Considering that both authorisation infrastructures and their en-
vironments are intrinsically dynamic, adaptation models should be related to
the architectural models of the infrastructure, models of the authorisation poli-
cies, and threat models. Adaption models should also capture how the controller
communicates with the authorisation infrastructure, which includes the moni-
toring and controlling of the infrastructure. If adaptation models do not related
to all models that enable the support of self-adaptation of authorisation infras-
tructures then inconsistencies might arise regarding the how self-adaptation is
enacted.
Example. In our example, adaptation models should be able to capture the dif-
ferent aspects of adapting an authorisation infrastructure, which includes adapt-
ing its architectural configuration or the components that are part of that con-
figuration. An example of component adaptation would be its ability of adapt-
ing authorisation policies in order to modify users’ ability to perform certain
operations, for example, restricting the amount of smart meter readings. An
adaptation model, that would be part of Customer Energy Management System
(EMS), should specify which parts of the authorisation policy can be adapted
and how. It should also specify how the adapted policy can be deployed in the
infrastructure. For example, it might be the case that the component responsible
for the authorisation service must be restarted, as it is not possible to reload the
authorisation policy without restarting the component.
Portability Portability can take different forms in self-adaptive authorisation
infrastructures. It could mean that the system can be deployed on various types
of infrastructures. It could also mean that the system should be able to function
in an heterogeneous environments, where different subsystems can communi-
cate with each other. The former requires some form of vertical transformation,
where abstract elements can be concretised in various ways, depending on the
underlying infrastructure. The latter requires some form of horizontal transfor-
mation, where models and data can be communicated between subsystems that
use different representations.
Challenge. The need for developing self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures
that can be vertically and horizontally portable. Vertically portable self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructures can easily be redeployed on different environments
or implementations of components. Horizontally portable self-adaptive authori-
sation infrastructures have components that may use different data formats and
protocols, but are still able to communicate with each other.
Relevance. Federated authorisation infrastructures have components con-
trolled by various entities. system they use. Components of these infrastructures
may run different technologies, or different versions of the same technology. They
may also evolve and change at any time. Therefore, it is necessary for the self-
adaptive authorisation infrastructure to be designed in a portable way.
Example. In our case study, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure may
be federated, with different entities handling parts of the authorisation and/or
authentication infrastructure. For example, the owner may delegate the authen-
tication to OAuth providers, such as, Google or Twitter, while the household
owners and the energy provider may have share responsibility over authorisation
for the access to the smart meter readings.
Facilitating negotiation Federated authorisation infrastructures require sev-
eral components working together. However, these components may be owned
and controlled by different entities, who may have conflicting goals and interests.
Therefore, it may be necessary for multiple components to negotiate a solution
that satisfies all parties.
Challenge. Models are required to facilitate negotiation between several com-
ponents of a federated authorisation infrastructure. In self-adaptive authorisa-
tion architectures, these models should allow components to understand the
consequences of the proposed changes on users’ ability to use the system, and
should allow components to express agreement or disagreement with some of
those changes.
Relevance. Self-adaptive federated authorisation infrastructures must be able
to handle negotiation between several of their components. They must be able to
exchange proposed solutions to problems, and indicate agreement or preferences.
The solutions will contain models of the proposed changes, in order for the
components to make informed decisions about the proposals they are presented
with.
Example. In our case study, the EMS and the energy company share access to
the smart meter readings. It is in the household’s interest to minimise the en-
ergy company’s data collection frequency, and the amount of data it can collect.
However, there is a minimum amount of data that the energy company needs to
collect in order to guarantee its service, and to be able to correctly invoice the
household. Since both the household’s and the energy company’s requirements
can change, they may have to re-negotiate the data collection frequency. A suit-
able model for such a negotiation would represent the amount of data that can
be collected and its frequency, and would allow each party to express agreement
or disagreement, in whole or in part, and to propose alternatives until a solution
can be found.
Capturing the history of models Capturing the history of models allows for
the analysis of changes that happened in the past. The detection of long-running
attacks, forensics analysis, and the detection of the entry point of an attacker
all require access to historical data about the state of the system.
Challenge. Self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures should be able to keep
a history of the models that they maintain, in such a way that does not de-
grade performance, yet allows for efficient analysis of past events. The ability to
correlate changes to different models is especially important.
Relevance. Attacks can be carried out over long periods of time. Hence, un-
derstanding them may require to analyse the past states of the self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure, both in order to detect and prevent attacks, but
also in order to identify patterns of suspicious behaviour over a long period of
time.
Example. The infrastructure in our case study focuses on the detection of in-
ternal threats, which means that, before carrying out their attacks, the attacker
must have been authenticated. In order to find out whether an attack was en-
acted by the legitimate holder of the credentials in question, or by an external
attacker who managed to impersonate them, it requires analysing the state of
the infrastructure at the time of authentication, how the authentication was car-
ried out, as well as, compare the behavioural patterns of the user at different
points in time.
Analysis capabilities The Analyse Stage of a self-adaptive system depend on
the available models in the knowledge base. If these models cannot completely
reflect the reality they represent, the Analyse stage may not be able to always
come to the correct conclusion, or even come to a conclusion at all. Therefore,
analysis on incomplete models may lead to uncertainty. If several analysis com-
ponents are used, this may also lead to conflicting results.
Challenge. Self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures should be able to deal
with uncertainty and conflicts, and these may need to be encoded in the models.
Relevance. Detection of insider threats is difficult because a smart malevolent
insider will attempt to try and pass their usage as legitimate. Therefore, there
is often no clear-cut distinction between legitimate and malicious users, making
their detection difficult and ambiguous. Moreover, in a federated self-adaptive
authorisation infrastructure, various Analyse stages may reach different conclu-
sions, even when considering the same data.
Example. The authorisation infrastructure may use models of users’ access to
resources to detect insider threats. One such model may represent each access
request, its timestamp, the resources requested, and the authorisation infrastruc-
ture’s response. One analysis may use the number of failed requests per hour,
and classify users as legitimate in the number of failed requests is smaller than
a threshold x, suspicious if between x and y (with x < y), and a threat if the
number of failed requests is higher than y. In this case, suspicious users are an
uncertain result: the analysis was not able to give a definite answer.
Another analysis could use the same data, but perform different operations
to detect insider threats. It could look a the total number of requests, whether
they were denied or not by the authorisation infrastructure. Similarly to the
first analysis component, if a user produces less than a requests per hour, it
is considered legitimate; between a and b (a < b) requests per hour, it is con-
sidered suspicious, and over b requests per hour, it is considered a threat. It is
possible that the two analysis will disagree on the nature of a particular user.
The self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure needs to deal with this conflict.
For example, it could run more analysis components over the same data until it
finds sufficient confirmation, or it could take a conservative approach and treat
the user as a threat if at least one the analyses has identified it as a threat.
Model drift Dynamic models are at risk of drift over time. Model drift is the
progressive increase in the discrepancy between the model and what the model
represents. In self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures, dynamic models are
used to represent the target system, as well as its environment. If the models
do not correctly reflect the reality, this may lead to sub-optimal, or harmful,
adaptation decisions.
Challenge. In self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures, model drift should
be avoided in order to reliably detect suspicious activity and identify malicious
actors.
Relevance. Attackers are likely to try and masquerade their actions as le-
gitimate in order to escape security measures. Therefore, it is important for
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures to keep models that are very close to
reality - even a small drift may be used by the attacker to cover their tracks.
Example. In our case study, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure main-
tains a model of the target system, which may include distributed access control
policies over several components of the authorisation infrastructure. If the self-
adaptive authorisation infrastructure cannot keep an accurate representation of
these policies, then it may believe that an authorisation request that the target
system will accept would be rejected, or vice-versa, leading to incorrect adapta-
tion decisions. For example, the self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure may
recognise that a user who is acting suspiciously has less permissions than he
actually has, and decide to treat it as a low priority threat, where in reality, the
user’s level of access should warrant a hight priority resolution of the issue.
7 Conclusions
RDL - evaluate the appropri-
atness of the MAPE-K loop
for supporting self-adaptive
access control.
The provision of self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures is a promising solu-
tion to protect systems against the dynamic nature of attacks and uncertainties
associated with them, such as, insider threats. In this paper, we have presented
how this could be achieved architecturally by separating the specification of
policies (i.e., self-adaptive authorisation) from the enforcement of these poli-
cies (i.e., self-adaptive access control). We have also presented several technical
challenges associated with the self-adaptation of authorisation infrastructures,
which followed the stages of the MAPE-K feedback control loop. Each of the
technical challenges was presented in terms of their relevance, and an example
was provided for demonstrating their pertinence. Of course, the list of techni-
cal challenges was not exhaustive since several of them were not included in
the description due to space constraints. Moreover, in addition to the identi-
fied technical challenges, restricted by our experience in building and deploying
self-adaptive of authorisation infrastructures [6,7], one would expect new tech-
nical challenges to arise, depending on authorisation infrastructure and their
deployment.
For presentation purposes, it was natural to follow the MAPE-K feedback
control loop for identifying the technical challenges, however, questions may be
asked about the appropriateness of MAPE-K loop when finding solutions to the
wide range of identified challenges. Authorisation infrastructure are inherently
quite complex infrastructures, which can be geographically distributed, and this
might require architectural solutions for the controller that might go beyond
what the classical MAPE-K loop can offer [23,74]. For example, if perpetual
evaluations [73] are needed in order to obtained assurances of the confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability of computer based resources regarding the adapta-
tions performed to the authorisation infrastructure, then new ways of enforcing
separation of concerns are needed at the controller level. This of course will
raise a new set of technical challenges that should be specific to the provision of
assurances.
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